Taken from the Transit Fabric source repository at commit 10a682c (10a682c933278f64f47f65e25711cd66d74552ac, main), file docs/whitepaper.md. Links into the private source tree are shown as plain text.
Transit
Fabric: A Cryptographically Verifiable fc00::/8 eBGP
Transit Fabric and Multi-Commodity Routing Market on Bittensor
Version: 1.3 (2026-11-13). Replaces 1.2, published earlier the same day.
Status labels. Every feature in this paper carries one of three labels:
- Live: runs today on Bittensor testnet, subnet 611
(tester build
v0.1.0-tester.3). Validators on 611 are all run by the Transit Fabric team for now. - Designed: specified in an ADR or spec, and built or partly built, but not yet on, or not yet scored. A design whose ADR is still proposed says so.
- Planned: decided or approved, and not built yet. A later phase is planned work off the launch path.
Launch is transit (Mechanism 0) and route solving (Mechanism 1) only. Transit Fabric is not yet registered on mainnet, so nothing described here runs there.
What changed in version 1.3
These changes follow the founder's answers to the 1.2 review on 2026-11-13.
- Economics rewritten to the current model (§6;
ADR-0053, ADR-0063, ADR-0064, ADR-0065). Removed: the 1.1 model's 80/20
company buyback, the company's 20% fee on protocol revenue, the
ALPHAstep-down tied to it, the subsidy ratios, and the three-year revenue, market-cap and company-income projections. §6 now says who pays whom, in what unit and what is burned, with ADR-0063's rate-card and clearing formulas, ADR-0065's TAO/USD conversion and a worked example, and the burn guards' values from the OQ-291 calibration. No new projection replaces the old ones. - How BandwidthOS earns (§6.3, §7). A reseller's margin, never protocol revenue. The protocol holds no money and charges no fee.
- BandwidthOS may run nodes, as a reference deployment (founder, 2026-11-13; ADR-0064 §8; §7.2). Open-source code and a public example for others to copy, with no protocol privilege and no special role. The hub-node projection and every "anchor" role are removed. How these nodes' emissions sit with the company's treasury rule is open (OQ-301).
- Go-to-market sequences (§7.4). The contract figures stay. The 1.1 buyback figure and the capacity-pay projection in Sequence 1 are removed; the BFD failover change in §7.1 stays.
- Change notes, abstract and §4.1 brought in line:
1.1 item 7 and 1.2 items 3 and 5 point to the new §6 and §7.2, and
§4.1's step 5 no longer describes the
ALPHAstep-down as current. The company form is still not decided (Inc. or LLC). - Owner share, BandwidthOS's nodes and telemetry (founder, 2026-11-13; ADR-0064 §8, OQ-301 closed). The subnet owner's 18% emission share is the owner's own, not BandwidthOS revenue. BandwidthOS's nodes are a reference example: their pay is ordinary operator pay, BandwidthOS burns TAO like every reseller, and its node UIDs are not separately disclosed. The telemetry feed is a later phase.
What changed in version 1.2
These decisions were made between 2026-11-08 and 2026-11-13 and are reflected in the sections below. Where a section still describes an older design, it says so.
- Route solvers also discover peers: the peering plan (System One autonomous peering design, approved 2026-11-12; abstract, §2.3, §4.2.1). Solvers compete on a peering plan, the adjacency set for the next window, alongside their route tables, and validators score plans and attest the winner by quorum. Node and solver RTTs are hints that can only narrow a node's placement. Planned, not built: its two ADRs and an incentive red team come first. Today peering is self-service.
- System One on the launch path (ADR-0067; §2.4).
fabric-senseships first on kernel, no-root and container nodes, as rules only. Two jobs are live on testnet 611: rebuilding a stale validator-set anchor, and automatic fault reports that are never a scoring input.bwos doctor,bwos reportand an agent skill share one symptom registry. The model, the skill library and routers come later. This narrows 1.1 item 6. - The buyer burns; nobody holds the money (ADR-0063,
proposed, revision 5; the founder chose burn on 2026-11-11; §6.2, §7.3).
A reseller buys wholesale capacity by calling
add_stake_burn, which buys the subnet's alpha from the pool and destroys it in the same call, signed by the buyer's own coldkey. There is no protocol treasury and no custodian. This replaces 1.1 item 2's "the company converts it to TAO and buys alpha" and the 1.1 80/20 buyback; 1.3 removes the projections built on it (§6). Details pending red team and simulation; not built (PB-49). - Wholesale is quoted in US dollars and settled by burning TAO (ADR-0065, accepted in principle on 2026-11-12, details proposed pending a red team; §6.2, §7.3). Each window's rate card carries one TAO/USD reference read from the chain at a fixed block. Bittensor's Gamma credits are a later option, not part of v0.
- BandwidthOS is the "model home" (ADR-0064; §7). BandwidthOS is the one company around Transit Fabric: the first reseller and first gateway. Everything it runs is open source, it has no protocol privilege, and it pays the same clearing price as any reseller. Its own alpha comes only from retail margin and sits on hotkeys that never set weights. This replaces 1.1 item 7's framing and §7.2's company-owned anchor routers with special roles. (1.3: BandwidthOS may run nodes only as a reference deployment, §7.2.)
- The name is Transit Fabric (ADR-0062, ADR-0066;
title and throughout). Transit Fabric is the open protocol and network;
BandwidthOS is only the company. Code keeps the
bwosnames until a trademark search before mainnet. The project's old name is retired everywhere. - Inline node bindings (ADR-0058; §2.1). Live. A hotkey binds up to 7 nodes inside its own on-chain commitment, with no server to publish from.
- Linking with a browser wallet (ADR-0054; §2.1). Live. A static page lets Talisman, SubWallet or Polkadot.js sign the binding, so no hotkey file sits on the operator's machine.
- Probe sessions keyed by the node key (ADR-0061; §2.1). Live. A node's probe sessions use the X25519 form of its node key, so no operator hands WireGuard bindings to validators.
- Proof of measurement work (ADR-0055, proposed, scoring gated off; §4.1). Validators would be paid a capped slice for measurement bytes nodes signed for, so measuring pays better than copying.
- Peer-load capacity tests (ADR-0056, proposed, scoring gated off; §3.3). Other operators' nodes make the load, with hidden validator slices, about 3 random calls a day with a reputation bond. If adopted, this replaces 1.1 item 3's "about 20 full-rate tests a day" and ADR-0039's validator-pushed team tests.
- Locational scarcity pricing (ADR-0057, proposed, gated off; §4.1). Capacity would pay more where it is scarce relative to demand, with placement from validator RTTs that a node can only make look farther, never closer.
- Sharded solving (ADR-0059, proposed, gated off; §4.2.2). Solving split by traffic class and destination region, with a fixed published merge of shard winners.
- Launch scope (
docs/launch-stages.md; §5, §7, §8.2). VPN exits, "Mine-to-Surf", fleet aggregator vouchers and the Transit Fabric Edge appliance are later phases, off the launch path. Registered gateways (ADR-0052) are planned before mainnet. §8.2 no longer claims node links resist DPI (ADR-0040).
What changed in version 1.1
These decisions were made on 2026-11-06 and are reflected in the sections below. Where a section still describes the older design, it says so. Version 1.2 revises some of them: item 2 by 1.2 items 3 and 4, item 3 by item 11 (proposed), item 4 by items 3 and 5, item 6 by item 2, and item 7 by item 5. Version 1.3 removes the projections built on item 2's buyback (§6).
- Unearned weight goes to a disclosed first-party UID, not a
burn or recycle UID (§4.2;
scoring.md§Unearned weight and the first-party UID). Version 1.0 sent the reference solver's share to a burn UID. That was dropped: the usual way to burn on Bittensor is to weight the owner's own hotkey, which the chain penalises by cutting the subnet's TAO share.- Routing (Mechanism 1): unearned weight goes to a
public first-party UID on a separate coldkey, and the amount is reported
every window. Unearned weight means the reference solver's share, or
everything when no solver scores. It shrinks as outside solvers beat the
reference solver by more than
EPSILON_ROUTE(2%). - Transit (Mechanism 0): unearned weight goes to no one. If no node has proven capacity in a window, validators set no transit weights at all.
- Routing (Mechanism 1): unearned weight goes to a
public first-party UID on a separate coldkey, and the amount is reported
every window. Unearned weight means the reference solver's share, or
everything when no solver scores. It shrinks as outside solvers beat the
reference solver by more than
- Nodes are paid only in emissions, and customer traffic is
checked, never credited (ADR-0053; §3.2, §4.1). Customers pay
the company in USDC. The company converts it to TAO and buys alpha.
(Revised in 1.2: no company sits in the middle. A reseller burns TAO
for wholesale capacity with
add_stake_burn, which buys alpha and destroys it, ADR-0063 and ADR-0065.) Vouchers, payments and client receipts are commercial metering, never a scoring input, so faking or steering "paid" traffic earns nothing. Mishandling customer traffic can only lower a node's score. - An always-on canary stream plus random full-rate bursts proves transit (ADR-0051; §3.3). Validators keep a low-rate canary stream through every node, on routes they allocate, checked at each hop. Frequent random full-rate tests catch burst-rented capacity.
- Buyback alpha never becomes validator power (ADR-0053, OQ-105). The company holds the alpha it buys on hotkeys that never set weights, and that stake counts for nothing in measurement. (Revised in 1.2: wholesale burns leave no alpha to hold. BandwidthOS's own alpha comes only from retail margin, under the same rule, ADR-0064 §6.)
- Gateways (ADR-0052; §7). Registered datacenter operators can on-ramp customers over BGP, cross-connects or a proxy. They can off-ramp to a customer's own network, or to allowlisted public destinations, so the customer's far end needs no Transit Fabric software. Ordinary transit nodes still never egress.
- One System One sidecar on every node, with a public skill library learned from the fleet (ADR-0047, ADR-0048, ADR-0050).
- The operating company is BandwidthOS (Inc. or LLC, not yet decided). (1.3: it earns a reseller's margin, never protocol revenue, §6.3.)
Code: a Rust workspace (bwos-core,
bwos-net, bwos-node, bwos-solver,
bwos-validator, bwos-probe,
bwos-chain, bwos-cli,
bwos-client, bwos-sim). Code identifiers keep
the bwos prefix until the trademark search before mainnet
(ADR-0062, ADR-0066). Transit Fabric is the protocol and the network;
BandwidthOS is a separate company, its first reseller (ADR-0064).
Abstract
The global internet backbone suffers from two structural inefficiencies: (1) stranded physical capacity, where datacenter and hosting operators purchase committed 95th-percentile transit and leave 30–60% of their committed headroom idle, and (2) performance-blind routing, where the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) selects paths by Autonomous System (AS) hop count and bilateral billing policy rather than real-time latency, jitter, packet loss, or link saturation. Hyperscalers (Google B4, Meta Express Backbone, Cloudflare Argo) solved these problems internally using private Software-Defined Wide Area Networks (SD-WANs) and centralized Multi-Commodity Flow (MCF) traffic-engineering solvers, but those capabilities remain locked inside proprietary corporate backbones. Meanwhile, first-generation decentralized bandwidth and VPN networks failed to capture institutional datacenter supply due to exit-node abuse liability, trivial self-dealing (wash-trading) of byte counters, and userspace cryptographic bottlenecks.
We present Transit Fabric, a Bittensor subnet that
turns committed datacenter and prosumer edge bandwidth into an open,
cryptographically verifiable Layer-3/Layer-4 transit fabric. Every node
and client in Transit Fabric derives a deterministic, unforgeable
/128 IPv6 Unique Local Address (fc00::/8)
directly from its Ed25519 public key, forming a flat, zero-registry eBGP
overlay (ASN 4200000000+) over WireGuard links: kernel
WireGuard on kernel nodes, and userspace WireGuard on nodes that run
without root. IPsec ESP (RFC 4303) and IEEE 802.1AE MACsec
backbone links are planned for later. To align incentives without a
central coordinator, Transit Fabric splits Bittensor emissions across
two specialized mechanisms: Mechanism 0
(mechid=0) rewards transit operators for verified
bottleneck capacity and conservation-of-flow traffic delivery, while
Mechanism 1 (mechid=1) runs a continuous
tournament among route solvers that compute capacity-aware, multi-class
(realtime, low_latency_hd, bulk,
economy, resilient) route tables. Solvers will
also discover peers: in the planned design, they compete on a
peering plan, the set of links the fabric runs next
window, which validators score and attest by quorum, so no node or
company chooses the topology. Transit nodes never egress to the public
internet; only registered exit partners and registered gateways do
(ADR-0004, ADR-0052). Nodes are paid only in
emissions: on testnet today for uptime and capacity proven by validator
tests, and, once the designed canary stream is scored, for carriage of a
validator-allocated canary stream checked at every hop
(ADR-0051). Customer traffic is checked, never credited
(ADR-0053), so wash-trading earns nothing, while forwarding
stays at kernel line rate. Customer money reaches the subnet by a burn
the buyer makes itself: a reseller buys wholesale capacity, quoted in US
dollars, by burning TAO into the subnet's pool, so no treasury or
company holds it and the protocol charges no fee (ADR-0063,
proposed; ADR-0065). BandwidthOS, the first reseller, earns
only its retail margin (ADR-0064). We validate the protocol
through a 50-window adversarial game-theoretic simulator, live
transatlantic multi-region deployments across North America and Europe,
and a public test network on Bittensor testnet, subnet 611.
1. Introduction & Motivation
1.1 The Stranded Datacenter Transit Opportunity
Institutional datacenter operators, bare-metal cloud providers, and regional colocation facilities purchase upstream IP transit on fixed monthly commitments (typically billed at the 95th percentile of 5-minute traffic samples over 10 Gbps, 40 Gbps, or 100 Gbps ports). To survive diurnal traffic peaks and DDoS bursts without incurring punitive overage rates, operators provision substantial headroom that sits idle for the majority of the billing cycle. Because the commit is already sunk, the marginal cost to an operator of carrying additional overlay transit traffic below their 95th-percentile commit is near zero.
1.2 The Pathology of Public Internet BGP
Even when physical fiber paths between two regions are uncongested, public internet BGP routinely selects suboptimal routes:
- AS-Path Blindness: Standard BGP selects routes
primarily by
LOCAL_PREFandAS_PATHlength. A 2-hop AS path with 4% packet loss and 45 ms of queuing jitter is preferred over a 4-hop AS path with 0% loss and 12 ms lower propagation delay. - Slow Convergence: Public BGP route convergence following a fiber cut or peering brownout can take tens of seconds to minutes, disrupting real-time voice, video, gaming, and distributed AI training workloads.
- No Native Quality-of-Service (QoS) Differentiation: Public BGP cannot simultaneously route a latency-critical flow over a low-jitter path, a bulk dataset transfer over a widest-bandwidth path, and a high-availability flow over interior-node-disjoint primary and backup paths.
Hyperscalers solved this by treating all of their datacenters as nodes in a single flat graph controlled by a traffic-engineering solver (such as Google's B4 and Cloudflare's Magic WAN). Transit Fabric brings this exact architecture to an open, permissionless market of independent operators.
1.3 Why First-Generation Decentralized Bandwidth Networks Failed
Prior attempts at tokenized bandwidth markets and decentralized VPNs (dVPNs) encountered three fatal failure modes:
- The Exit Liability Trap: Legacy dVPNs required every bandwidth provider to act as a public internet exit node. When an anonymous user routed abusive traffic (DMCA violations, credential stuffing, or port scanning) through a node, the hosting operator received abuse complaints and risked immediate upstream BGP session termination. Consequently, institutional datacenter operators refused to participate, leaving legacy dVPNs with unreliable residential proxies.
- The Wash-Trading Death Spiral: Protocols that rewarded miners proportional to "bytes relayed" without route-assignment enforcement or burn-backed demand verification were immediately gamed. Miners spun up two colluding nodes in the same datacenter rack and transmitted gigabits per second of synthetic loop traffic to capture 99% of token emissions.
- Userspace Mixnet Bottlenecks: Privacy mixnets that wrap every packet in multi-layer userspace cryptography (e.g., Sphinx packet formats) incur severe CPU and serialization overhead, reducing throughput to a few megabits per second and adding hundreds of milliseconds of latency—rendering them unusable for institutional transit or daily desktop networking.
Transit Fabric resolves all three failure modes at the protocol layer:
- Strict Transit vs. Exit Separation
(
ADR-0004): Mechanism 0 transit nodes never egress packets to the public internet; they only forward encryptedfc00::/8-to-fc00::/8overlay traffic between bound peers. Public internet egress is performed only by registered Exit Partners (crypto-accepting VPN providers) and registered gateways (datacenter operators that meet published criteria, carrying paid, allowlisted traffic only,ADR-0052). Neither exists yet: gateways are planned before mainnet, and VPN exits are a later phase. On testnet 611 nothing leaves the overlay. - Solver-Assigned Routes + Conservation-of-Flow
Receipts: Miners cannot choose their own traffic paths. Transit
is only rewarded on paths assigned by the winning Mechanism 1 route
table (or unannounced Validator Canary Probes), verified by adjacent
co-signed
HopReceiptsand per-hop digests. Since version 1.1, nodes are paid only in emissions, and customer traffic is never credited (ADR-0053), so synthetic loop traffic earns nothing. - Cryptographic Control Plane, Kernel Data Plane:
Cryptography is used to derive
/128IPv6 identities, authenticate route tables, and co-sign periodic byte-counter receipts, while packet forwarding runs at line rate in the OS kernel (WireGuardandFQ/BBRtoday;IPsec ESPandMACsecplanned). Nodes without root forward in userspace instead, at lower rates (§2.3).
2. System Architecture & Cryptographic Identity
The diagram shows the launch path (Mechanism 0, Mechanism 1 and validators) and, dashed, the later-phase client and exit layers.
flowchart LR
subgraph Edge["Client & Edge Layer (later phase)"]
C["bwos-client (macOS / Windows / OpenWrt)\nEd25519 Key -> fc00::/8 (/128)"]
end
subgraph Mech0["Mechanism 0: Transit Fabric (fc00::/8 eBGP over WireGuard)"]
I["Ingress Node\n(WireGuard + HopReceipt)"]
T1["Transit Node A\n(kernel or no-root, eBGP + System One)"]
T2["Transit Node B\n(kernel or no-root, eBGP + System One)"]
end
subgraph ExitLayer["Exit Partners & Gateways (ADR-0004, ADR-0052; not on testnet)"]
E["Registered Exit or Gateway\n(egress for paid, allowlisted traffic)"]
W["Public Internet\n(TLS 1.3 / TCP / UDP)"]
end
subgraph Control["Validators & Mechanism 1 Solvers"]
S["Route Solvers (mechid=1)\nRoute tables; peering plans (planned)"]
V["Validators (bwos-validator + bwos-probe)\nProbe Sessions + Capacity Tests + Subtensor Weights"]
end
C -. "1. Client traffic (later phase)" .-> I
I -- "2. eBGP Assigned Path\n+ Co-Signed HopReceipt" --> T1
T1 -- "3. eBGP Assigned Path\n+ Co-Signed HopReceipt" --> T2
T2 -. "4. Co-Signed HopReceipt" .-> E
E -. "5. Public Egress (:443)" .-> W
S -- "Commit-Reveal RouteTable\n(+ PeeringPlan, planned)" --> V
V -- "Attested RouteTable\n(+ PeeringPlan, planned)" --> Mech0
V -- "Probes and Capacity Tests" --> Mech0
2.1 Separation of Network Identity and Economic Identity
Transit Fabric enforces a strict cryptographic boundary between a
machine's network identity and an operator's
economic identity
(docs/specs/identity.md):
| Key Type | Algorithm | Storage Location | Protocol Role |
|---|---|---|---|
| Node Key | Ed25519 (RFC 8032) |
Node / Appliance
(~/.bwos/node.key, 0600) |
Network identity; derives
fc00::/8 IPv6 address; signs HopReceipts,
WgBindings, the node's consent and its fault reports. Its
X25519 form keys the node's probe sessions (ADR-0061) |
| WireGuard Key | X25519 (RFC 7748) |
Node / Client
(~/.bwos/wg.key, 0600) |
Ephemeral/rotatable tunnel transport key
bound via signed WgBinding |
| Operator Hotkey | sr25519 (Subtensor) |
Off-box Operator Wallet (browser wallet or CLI) | Economic identity (UID); signs
NodeBindings and CapacityDeclarations, or
commits an inline binding |
| Client Key | Ed25519 (RFC 8032) |
End-user device
(~/.bwos/client.key, 0600) |
Later phase. Derives client
fc00::/8 address; signs ClientReceipts and
FleetEnrollments |
Appliances and transit servers never hold a Bittensor
hotkey, and System One never reads a key or signs anything
(Invariant 5, ADR-0067). Each node signs a
consent naming the hotkey it may be bound to, and
delivers it to validators over its own probe session. An operator then
links nodes to their Bittensor UID in one of two ways:
- Inline binding (live,
ADR-0058). For 1 to 7 nodes, the hotkey writes the node keys and a validity range straight into its own on-chain commitment, in at most two 128-byte fields. The chain already authenticates the hotkey and subnet, so no signature and no server are needed. An inline binding takes precedence over any other binding the UID names. - Manifest binding (live,
ADR-0015,ADR-0036). For more nodes, the operator publishes a hotkey-signedNodeBinding(domainnode-binding), whose SHA-256 digest is committed on-chain through a commitment manifest and served via content-addressed HTTP (/v0/objects/node-binding/<sha256>).
Either way, the operator can sign with a browser wallet (Talisman,
SubWallet or Polkadot.js) on a static "Link with your wallet" page, with
no hotkey file on their machine (live, ADR-0054), or with
the bwos bind command. A node counts only in a binding
whose hotkey it has consented to, so listing someone else's node gains
nothing. A node that has consented to two hotkeys whose bindings both
survive counts for neither (docs/specs/identity.md, Binding
resolution).
2.2
Zero-Registry Cryptographic IPv6 Addressing (fc00::/8)
On the public internet, participating in BGP requires acquiring an Autonomous System Number (ASN) and IP prefix from a Regional Internet Registry (ARIN, RIPE, APNIC) and maintaining RPKI Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs).
In Transit Fabric, every node and client deterministically derives a
unique /128 IPv6 address inside the RFC 4193 Unique Local
Address (fc00::/8) space directly from its 32-byte Ed25519
public key
:
This construction provides three critical properties:
- Zero Key Grinding: Unlike CJDNS (which requires
brute-force CPU grinding until a double-SHA-512 hash begins with
0xfc), Transit Fabric prepends the0xfcULA prefix byte to the first 15 bytes (120 bits) of the double-SHA-512 digest. Key generation takes less than 50 microseconds on any CPU while providing collision resistance. - Impossible BGP Prefix Hijacking: Because the
/128IPv6 address is a one-way cryptographic function of , no node on the overlay can originate or spoof a route forfcxx:...without possessing the corresponding Ed25519 private key. - Universal Peer Parity: Every participant—whether a
100 Gbps core router in Frankfurt, a cloud VM in Illinois, or a macOS
laptop on Wi-Fi—speaks the exact same
fc00::/8addressing scheme.
2.3 Flattened eBGP Control Plane and Kernel Data Plane
Rather than inventing a custom routing protocol, Transit Fabric
treats every node as a first-class datacenter router speaking standard
eBGP and BFD over point-to-point encrypted links. Two node kinds speak
the same protocol, and both are live on testnet 611
(ADR-0033):
- Kernel node: Linux with root, kernel WireGuard and
FRRouting (
bgpd+bfdd), set up by one install script. - No-root node: one static binary with no root, no
TUN device and no capabilities, as a process or a container. It runs
BGP, BFD and WireGuard (
boringtun) in userspace on an in-process IPv6/TCP stack. One flow over it carries about 220 Mb/s on cloud VMs.
Both kinds share these properties:
- Deterministic 4-Byte Private ASN Derivation: Each
node derives an RFC 6996 4-byte private ASN from its public key
(
OVERLAY_BASE_ASN = 4,200,000,000+ deterministic node offset), originating its/128fc00::/8loopbacks into eBGP. - Sub-Second BFD Failover: Bidirectional Forwarding
Detection (
bfddon kernel nodes,bwos_net::bfdon no-root nodes,3 × 200 msintervals, so 600 ms detection) monitors every adjacent peer link. If a primary link drops, the BGP session ends and traffic moves to the solver-precomputedbackup_path: measured at 544-716 ms in namespaces and an outage of 520-680 ms over the internet (docs/results/phase-a-spikes.md), without waiting for global control-plane reconvergence. - Transport Encryption & Host Kernel Tuning:
- Every node today (live): WireGuard
(
ChaCha20-Poly1305) with key-rotatedWgBindings: kernel WireGuard on kernel nodes, userspace WireGuard on no-root nodes. - Datacenter Backbone (planned,
ADR-0010): Point-to-point IPsec ESP (RFC 4303, AES-256-GCM) or Layer-2 IEEE 802.1AE MACsec (GCM-AES-128/256) with deterministic pairwise key derivation (ipsec-ike-psk,ipsec-esp-key,macsec-cak,macsec-ckn) for hardware NIC crypto offload (mlx5/ Intel QAT). - Host TCP/UDP Offload Profile
(
bwos-node tune-host): Configures Linuxfqpacing +BBRcongestion control, 64 MB socket buffers (net.core.rmem_max = 67108864), andethtoolUDP GRO forwarding (rx-udp-gro-forwarding on).
- Every node today (live): WireGuard
(
Peering: who links to whom
A node is paid for capacity only when it has a data plane: a BGP session with at least one node of another UID (live). Which nodes peer is therefore part of the network's design, not each node's private choice.
Today (live, self-service). An operator posts a peer card in a "Peering request" Issue. A public node the team runs adds the new node by itself (autopeer) once validators list it, within per-UID and total caps. Operators can also swap peer cards with each other. Two nodes both behind NAT can't peer yet.
Planned: peer discovery by System One and the solvers (System One autonomous peering design, approved 2026-11-12; not built). The goal is that a new node, checked an hour after it joins, has found good, diverse peers by a draw no one can steer, and is carrying traffic.
- Publish. Each node publishes a signed peering
record (its WireGuard key, its reachable endpoints or "dial-out only",
its
WgBinding), which validators carry in the attested directory. - Draw. Every window, each node gets candidates from
a draw seeded by
SHA-256(block hash at the window's start ‖ node key), which validators can recompute. Diversity is a constraint of the draw, not a preference: no two candidates share an operator, an ASN or address block, or, where others exist, the node's own region. - Bootstrap and measure. A new node peers with its drawn candidates at once, within each side's caps, and measures every link.
- Plan. Route solvers compete to produce the peering plan for the next window, and validators attest the winner by quorum (§4.2.1). Nodes apply the attested plan with hysteresis and a cap on changes per window. Every plan keeps a share of each node's links from its current draw, so new nodes are always discovered.
- Suspend, with evidence. A node may suspend a link that is failing right now, for a bounded time, and publishes the measurement as evidence. Whether the link is dropped is the next plan's decision, from measurements that several reporters corroborate.
Neither the subnet owner nor BandwidthOS gets any peering advantage (
ADR-0064§4).- Publish. Each node publishes a signed peering
record (its WireGuard key, its reachable endpoints or "dial-out only",
its
2.4 System One:
the node's own watchdog (ADR-0067)
System One (fabric-sense) is signed
code that runs beside every node and acts in the fabric's interest by
following rules anyone can check. It holds no key and signs nothing;
where a step needs a key or a human, it says exactly what to do.
- Rules and model. Rules decide everything that
affects other nodes, deterministically. A model may diagnose locally and
recommend, but only rules act. At launch System One is rules
only; the model comes later (
ADR-0047,ADR-0048). - Three outcomes. Every action ends as
fixed,recommendorreport, tied to a code in one symptom registry (docs/specs/symptoms.md) thatbwos doctor, System One and agents all read. A fix runs at most 3 times a day per code, then escalates instead of looping. - Live on testnet 611, on kernel, no-root and
container nodes (routers later):
- Job 2: rebuild a stale validator-set anchor. When the node's validator set expires, System One builds a current one from the chain and verifies it. In a container it writes the new set in place; on a kernel node it only offers a candidate, which the operator adopts with one command, under quorum-overlap checks, because the validator set is the node's trust root.
- Job 5: automatic fault reports. A crash, or a
problem System One could not fix, becomes a signed fault report with a
fixed set of fields (code, version, commit, node kind, platform, an
assertion hash, window, and the fix tried). It carries no logs,
addresses, keys or peers. The node's probe session signs and forwards it
to validators, at most 4 per node per window. Validators publish counts
per code and version only. The operator controls what is sent
(
report.auto), and fault reports are never a scoring input. bwos doctorlists a node's checks as JSON and changes nothing;bwos reportbuilds a redacted bug bundle; an agent skill lets an AI agent install, check and troubleshoot a node under hard rules (testnet only, never a coldkey, seed or hotkey file).
- Planned: automatic peering (job 1, §2.3),
capacity-declaration lapse notices (job 3), NAT and closed-port fixes
(job 4), the model in report-only mode, and the public skill library
learned from the fleet (
ADR-0050).
3. Cryptographic Accounting & Conservation of Flow
A decentralized transit market is only as strong as its resistance to
fabricated traffic. Transit Fabric enforces conservation of
flow across every multi-hop path using four cryptographic
primitives serialized in strict canonical JSON
(docs/specs/encoding.md: lexicographically sorted UTF-8
keys, no whitespace, integer-only numbers, and domain-separated
signatures over
"BWOS-v0/" || domain || "\0" || canonical_bytes).
3.1 Adjacent Co-Signed
HopReceipts
Every RECEIPT_INTERVAL (30 s), each pair of
adjacent nodes
on an active path exchanges and co-signs cumulative byte counters for
the current window
across three accounting classes (paid, free,
canary):
{
"v": 0,
"window": 1234,
"seq": 17,
"up": "<upstream_node_pubkey_hex>",
"down": "<downstream_node_pubkey_hex>",
"bytes": { "paid": 123456789, "free": 0, "canary": 4567890 },
"sig_up": "<ed25519_hex>",
"sig_down": "<ed25519_hex>"
}- Monotonicity: Within a window
,
byte counters for each class MUST be monotonically non-decreasing with
sequence number
seq. - Bilateral Tolerance Gate: Upstream node
proposes its cumulative transmitted bytes and signs
sig_up(domainhop-receipt). Downstream node compares 's proposed counts against its own received byte counters. If the discrepancy is withinRECEIPT_TOLERANCE_PPM(), appendssig_down. Otherwise, counter-proposes its own lower counts. Unilateral (single-signed) receipts earn zero credit. - Multi-Hop Chain Conservation Check: Given an
assigned route
,
validators verify the chain of highest-
seqco-signed receipts :- If any interior hop
's
reported bytes exceed both its upstream receipt
and downstream receipt
by more than
RECEIPT_TOLERANCE_PPM, hop is flagged for inflation and its credit on that path is zeroed. - If any interior receipt is missing, the entire multi-hop chain is zeroed for that window segment.
- Across diamond or DAG topologies where multiple routes traverse a
shared bottleneck link
,
validators aggregate flow conservation across the union of assigned
routes so legitimate shared hops are never falsely penalized
(
crates/bwos-core/src/validator.rs).
- If any interior hop
's
reported bytes exceed both its upstream receipt
and downstream receipt
by more than
3.2
Boundary Attestation: ClientReceipts and
BandwidthVouchers
Superseded for scoring by ADR-0053 (version 1.1). Client receipts and vouchers remain commercial metering: quota, billing, and destination allowlists for gateways. They are never a scoring input. A colluding path gains nothing by co-signing fake
paidbytes, because paid bytes earn no emissions. The 1.0 text below describes the retired design and is kept for reference. Its code paths are removed in roadmap PB-40.
While HopReceipts prevent interior nodes from inflating
counters relative to their neighbors, what stops an entire colluding
path
from co-signing fake paid bytes?
Transit Fabric closes this boundary loop with two end-to-end
mechanisms (ADR-0016, ADR-0019):
- Client Receipts (
client-receipt): The end-user client (bwos-client) signs cumulative delivery receipts binding(window, client, ingress, egress, bytes). Validators verify thatpaidbytes claimed at the ingress hop are covered by validClientReceiptswithinRECEIPT_TOLERANCE_PPM. Any uncoveredpaidbytes are automatically downgraded tofree(W_FREE = 250,000ppm vs.W_PAID = 1,000,000ppm). - Burn-Backed Bandwidth Vouchers
(
bandwidth-voucher): To qualify aspaidtraffic (W_PAID), a session must be authorized by aBandwidthVouchersigned by a registered Exit Partner or Fleet Aggregator:- Issuing a
BandwidthVoucherrequires a mandatory minimum protocol burn/fee ofPROTOCOL_VOUCHER_BURN_PPM(, with default in simulation). - Because any miner attempting to mint vouchers to wash-trade their own transit nodes forfeits the protocol burn upfront and must share Mechanism 0 emissions with all honest capacity and usage on the subnet, self-dealing is strictly negative-EV.
- Issuing a
3.3 Unannounced Canary Probes & Random Saturation Capacity Tests
Updated in version 1.1 (ADR-0051, ADR-0053):
- An always-on canary stream. Validators keep a low-rate canary stream through every node, on node pairs they allocate by a verifiable draw. The production table supplies only the hops.
- Secret schedules. Each validator's schedule is secret until the window ends: it is committed before the window and revealed after.
- Checked at every hop. Only bytes that reach the validator's sink and pass per-hop digests count.
- Shaped like real traffic. Canaries follow global traffic statistics and include full-rate flows, so throttling shows up as well as dropping.
- Frequent random full-rate tests. About 20 a day per node on testnet (
CAP_TEST_PERIOD360 blocks, Task 15b), so capacity rented only for test bursts shows up on the renter's bill.- Team tests. The full-rate tests run 60 s and are pushed by a team of validators (ADR-0039).
Specified in Task 14 and PB-38. The 1.0 text below describes the earlier shared, computable schedule.
Status in version 1.2:
- Live on testnet 611. Each node opens a probe session to every validator's probe agent. Validators check over it that the node answers (uptime), relay link probes through the node to its BGP peers, and test its capacity: a public node runs a capacity-test sink, and a node behind NAT dials out when a validator asks (an interim method that credits at most 100 Mb/s).
- Designed, not yet scored. The always-on canary stream checked at every hop (ADR-0051, PB-38).
- Proposed, scoring gated off: peer-load capacity tests (ADR-0056). Instead of validators pushing the load, other operators' nodes make it. A test of node
Nis cut into slices that run from a source node, throughN, to a sink, each endpoint drawn uniformly per UID from other operators by a coordinator's committed secret, and never sharingN's UID, coldkey group or ASN. A few slices are sourced and sunk by validators, hidden among the rest, so a node can't tell which slices are checked. Calls come about 3 times a day at secret times, backed by a reputation bond. This would replace 1.1's "about 20 full-rate tests a day".
Validators run bwos-probe daemons from distributed
vantage points using a shared, deterministic probe schedule seeded by
the Subtensor block hash (docs/specs/measurement.md):
- Indistinguishable Canary Flows: Validator canary
probes are padded and encapsulated to look identical to
paidcustomer traffic on the wire. Transit nodes cannot selectively prioritize probes over customer traffic. - Random Saturation Capacity Tests: Every
CAP_TEST_PERIOD(900 blocks), validators select nodes pseudorandomly for aCAP_TEST_SECONDS(10 s) saturation burst to measure actual deliverable throughput against declared capacity :- If (within 10% tolerance), the node receives full credit for its declared capacity: .
- If a node over-claims its physical capacity
(),
it suffers an immediate
OVERCLAIM_PENALTY_PPM() haircut below its measured throughput: This penalty persists forCAP_PENALTY_WINDOWS(24 windows), and capacity declarations are subject to aCAP_CHANGE_WINDOWS(24 windows) cooldown.
4. Dual-Mechanism Incentive Design
All scoring in Transit Fabric
(crates/bwos-core/src/scoring/mod.rs) is implemented in
100% deterministic integer fixed-point arithmetic
(u128/i128 parts-per-million,
,
with floor division and deterministic BTreeMap UID
ordering). Given identical committed inputs, every honest validator on
any CPU architecture computes byte-identical Subtensor weight
vectors.
4.1
Mechanism 0 (mechid=0): Physical Transit Capacity &
Verified Usage
For each transit operator UID in window :
Verified Fleet Capacity () and Uptime-Weighted Capacity ():
where is the operator's probe availability (uptime in ppm) and . Squaring uptime strongly penalizes flaky nodes ( uptime yields capacity credit).Node Delivery Quality ():
Crucially, is computed deterministically by validators from the window's topology snapshot link latencies (routing::route_predicted_us), never trusted from an unverified solver estimate. With , a node with packet loss receives .
Updated in version 1.1 (ADR-0053): the usage term becomes verified canary carriage only: validator-allocated, delivered, digest-passing bytes. Paid and free customer bytes never enter it. Until PB-38 lands, Mechanism 0 pays on capacity alone (), and the paid-traffic trigger described in 1.0 is retired (PB-40). Steps 3 and 5 below describe the 1.0 design.
Status in version 1.2:
- Live on testnet 611: Mechanism 0 pays on uptime-weighted verified capacity alone (), and only to nodes with a data plane: a BGP session with a node of another UID (§2.3). With no proven capacity in a window, validators set no Mechanism 0 weights.
- Proposed, gated off: locational scarcity pricing (ADR-0057). Mechanism 0 today pays the same per Mbps wherever the Mbps is, so cheap capacity piles up in a few cities. ADR-0057 multiplies a node's credit by a regional price : demand share over supply share, where demand comes from inputs miners can't move. A node's region comes only from validator RTT probes, using the light cone: added delay can make a node look farther from a site, never closer, and regions are separated so that "farther" can never mean "somewhere else". Total emissions stay fixed. Until it turns on, for every node.
- Proposed, gated off: proof of measurement work (ADR-0055). A capped slice of Mechanism 0 would go to each validator's measurer UID, for canary and capacity-test bytes it sent that nodes signed for, capped by its stake share. A validator that copies others' revealed results has no such evidence, so measuring pays better than copying.
Quality-Adjusted Verified Usage ():
where class weights are , , and , and is the geographic/ASN diversity multiplier.Usage Concentration Cap (
USAGE_SHARE_CAP): To prevent a single large operator from monopolizing usage emissions, no UID's usage share may exceedUSAGE_SHARE_CAP() whenever at least UIDs have positive usage. Excess share is iteratively clipped and redistributed pro rata across uncapped UIDs.Blended Mechanism 0 Share ():
In 1.0, ( bonded capacity, verified traffic usage). Since 1.1 the capacity weight isW, which is (capacity only) until PB-38's canary-carriage term lands, and the step-down tied to paid traffic is retired (ADR-0053, PB-40).
4.2
Mechanism 1 (mechid=1): Competitive Multi-Commodity Route
Solving
In Mechanism 1, route solvers compete every window via commit-reveal
(hash("route-table", table)) to optimize the global route
table across five distinct QoS traffic classes (ADR-0017,
ADR-0018). In the planned design they also compete on the
peering plan, which decides which links the fabric runs
(§4.2.1).
Live on testnet 611: a solver runs
bwos-solver daemon around its own solver program, in any
language. Each window it takes the validators' attested snapshot,
solves, signs and commits a manifest naming its table before the
deadline, and serves the table at its hotkey's axon for validators to
pull. A table must beat the open-source reference solver by
EPSILON_ROUTE (2%) to be paid.
| Traffic Class | Target Use Case | Composite Objective Weights | Hard SLA Gate |
|---|---|---|---|
realtime |
VoIP, trading, gaming, interactive SSH | , , | |
low_latency_hd |
4K video conferencing, cloud desktop | , | |
bulk |
AI checkpoint sync, dataset replication | , | |
economy |
Background backups, low-cost transit | , | |
resilient |
Mission-critical dual-path HA links | Valid disjoint backup_path,
|
For each sampled demand pair , validators evaluate the normalized improvement components clamped to relative to the measured direct internet baseline:
Latency Gain ():
Jitter Gain ():
Loss-Adjusted Bottleneck Bandwidth Gain ():
Congestion-Adjusted Cost Gain (): Each link with utilization incurs a quadratic congestion surcharge:
encouraging solvers to spill traffic smoothly across parallel paths before any single bottleneck saturates.Disjoint Backup Multiplier (): For
resilientroutes, () ifbackup_pathshares neither interior nodes nor directed links withpath, and () if it is link-disjoint but shares an interior node.
Solver Score & Anti-Copycat Tournament Selection
A solver 's overall window score is computed using the lower median of pairwise gains minus feasibility and route-flapping penalties:
- Copycat Exclusion (updated in 1.1): only solvers
that beat the reference solver by more than
EPSILON_ROUTEearn a rung, and everything at or below the reference is unearned. A copy of last window's production table scores 0. In the 1.0 rule, any non-reference solver whose score is withinEPSILON_ROUTE() of the open-source reference solver (bwos-solver), or whose pairwise gain vector duplicates the reference solver or an earlier-committed solver, is eliminated. - Winner & Unearned Allocation: The
highest-scoring solver replaces the incumbent only if
.
Every table is graded against the next window's snapshot, and solvers
are paid on a graded ladder: the top
LADDER_N(8) positive scores take rungs whose weights halve (LADDER_DECAY_PPM), and a table withinCLONE_DISTANCE_PPM(2%) of one committed in the same block or earlier scores 0 (scoring.md§Mechanism 1, ADR-0035). Any share won by the reference solver is unearned weight: it goes to the owner's disclosed first-party UID under a separate coldkey, never to an owner-coldkey hotkey or a burn UID, and is reported publicly (scoring.md§Unearned weight and the first-party UID). Unearned transit weight (Mechanism 0) goes to no one: with no proven capacity in a window, validators set no Mechanism 0 weights.
4.2.1 Peer discovery: solvers compete on the peering plan (planned)
Status: planned. The design was approved on 2026-11-12 (System One autonomous peering design). It needs two ADRs (peering records and dynamic peers; peering plans in Mechanism 1) and an incentive red team before it is built, and it comes before the bug bounty. Nothing here is built or scored today; peering is self-service (§2.3).
A route table can only use links that exist. Today those links come from operators asking for peers, which is the opposite of what a fabric needs: a topology that is good for the whole network, which no node's own preference decides. The design gives that job to the solvers, who already see the whole snapshot and compete on routing.
- Solvers compete on two outputs. Alongside its route table, a solver produces a peering plan: the adjacency set, which pairs of nodes peer, for the next window. Whether plan and table are one submission or two, and how a plan pays, is for the ADR to settle.
- Validators score plans and attest the winner. Validators grade a plan as they grade tables: on the next window's snapshot, by the network-wide gain it delivers under the tables that ran on it, less a churn penalty and penalties for breaking the diversity rules, the exploration share or per-node caps. The winning plan is attested by validator quorum, so its authority comes from validator consensus, not from any one solver. Nodes apply only a plan with quorum; without one, a node keeps its current peers and its draw.
- The draw explores; plans exploit. The block-hash-seeded draw (§2.3) creates and measures new links, and every plan must keep a share of each node's links from its draw. Plans then choose the best of what has been measured, and the topology can't harden around one group.
- Position hints. Nodes' and solvers' RTTs add vantage points beyond the validators' sites. They count only as hints that can only narrow a validator placement (ADR-0057) or flag a conflict. They never place a node by themselves, because nodes and solvers are paid participants, and m-of-n medians plus the light cone keep any one reporter from moving a node.
- The self-dealing concern. A solver could write plans that favor its own operator's nodes. This must be settled by the incentive red team before plans affect anything. The diversity rules, the exploration share and per-node caps are the design's first limits on it; whether they are enough is the red team's question.
- Rollout. First, automatic peering by the draw ships with plans in shadow mode: solvers submit plans, validators score them and publish a leaderboard, and nodes still follow the draw. Plans pay nothing and aren't a scoring input, which measures how much better solver plans are than the draw. After the red team, plans become binding on testnet and pay through Mechanism 1, activated at a scheduled block (ADR-0049). The bug bounty runs on binding plans, and mainnet gets them only after its findings are fixed.
4.2.2 Sharded solving (proposed)
ADR-0059 (proposed, gated off) splits solving by traffic-class group and destination region, decided by the founder on 2026-11-09. Each shard has its own competition, and the production table is a fixed, published merge of the shard winners that every validator recomputes and attests. It is not a table any company operates. Sharding by destination keeps every route towards a destination inside one shard, so the merged table stays loop-free. With one shard, it reproduces today's Mechanism 1 exactly. Implementation follows the first testnet wave.
5.
Prosumer Edge Fleet Aggregation & The "Mine-to-Surf" Loop
(ADR-0019) — later phase
Later phase, off the launch path. Launch is transit and route solving only. VPN exits, the client app and fleet-aggregator vouchers come after it (
docs/launch-stages.md, Stage 5). Vouchers are commercial only and never earn emissions (ADR-0053), and the 1.0 voucher burn is retired. This section keeps the idea in short form.
Bittensor subnets have a fixed number of UID slots (e.g., 256), so desktop and home-lab users can't each register a UID. Two things address that:
- Today (live): one UID can bind many nodes: up to 7 inline in its commitment, more through a commitment manifest (§2.1). A home node behind NAT can run as a no-root node or container and be measured and paid like any other.
- Later phase, Fleet Aggregators: a device signs a
FleetEnrollment(domainfleet-enrollment) to join an aggregator's UID, which may keep a capped commission (MAX_AGGREGATOR_COMMISSION_PPM, 20%) and shares the rest of the UID's emissions in proportion to verified contribution. - Later phase, "Mine-to-Surf": an edge user could
turn what their node earns into a
BandwidthVoucherfor VPN exit access, with no card or account. Vouchers here are purely commercial: they authorize traffic at an exit or gateway and never enter scoring.
6. Tokenomics: Emissions, Wholesale and the Buyer-Side Burn
Version 1.3 note (founder, 2026-11-13). This section is rewritten to the current model. Removed: the 1.1 model's 80/20 company buyback, the company's 20% fee on protocol revenue, the
ALPHAstep-down tied to the buyback, the subsidy ratios, and the three-year revenue, market-cap and company-income projections (1.2's §6.2 and §6.3). Their premises are retired (ADR-0053, ADR-0063, ADR-0064, ADR-0065), and the current model has no projection to replace them. In their place, this section says who pays whom, in what unit, and what is burned.Status. Emissions-only pay is accepted (ADR-0053) and live on testnet 611 as capacity pay (§4.1). The buyer-side burn is the decided direction: the founder approved ADR-0063's direction and chose burn over recycle on 2026-11-11 (OQ-288). ADR-0063 itself is still proposed (revision 5), pending its red team and PB-49's simulations. US-dollar quoting (ADR-0065) is accepted in principle, with its details proposed. None of the wholesale path is built (PB-49).
6.1 Two flows that never meet (ADR-0053)
Transit Fabric keeps protocol pay and customer money in two separate flows. Nothing from the second ever enters the first as a scoring input.
- The emissions flow (live on testnet). Nodes,
gateways, solvers and validators are paid only in the subnet's alpha
emissions, allocated by what validators measure themselves: capacity and
uptime today, canary carriage once PB-38 scores it (Mechanism 0), and
routing quality (Mechanism 1). No node is paid for carrying traffic
directly. The economic model's inputs
(
docs/economics/README.md, as of 2026-10-17) are Bittensor's3,600 TAO/dayof network emissions and the per-subnet split of 41% to miners (here, nodes and solvers), 41% to validators and 18% to the subnet owner. The owner's share is the subnet owner's own; it is not BandwidthOS revenue and not a protocol fund. - The commercial flow (designed, ADR-0063 proposed). Customers pay resellers. Resellers buy wholesale capacity by burning TAO, and pay gateways a port fee. Payments, vouchers, credits, client receipts and the rate card are never a scoring input, so faking, buying or steering "paid" traffic earns nothing, and mishandling customer traffic can only lower a score (ADR-0053 §2).
How customer money reaches nodes and solvers: through the
pool, never through receipts (ADR-0053 §4, ADR-0063). A
wholesale purchase buys the subnet's alpha from its pool with TAO and
destroys it. Each purchase puts TAO into the pool and removes the alpha
it bought. A subnet's share of network emissions depends on its pool:
the economic model takes it as set by the alpha price, and ADR-0065
counts a burn as TAO flow into the pool for the emission share. Either
way, more customers make every participant's emissions worth more.
Nobody, the company included, can move any participant's slice:
allocation within the subnet is set only by measurement (ADR-0049,
ADR-0053). One caution from ADR-0063 (OQ-288):
SubnetAlphaOut doesn't drop on a burn, so a supply figure
derived from it overstates circulating alpha.
6.2 Who pays whom, in what unit, and what is burned (ADR-0063, ADR-0065)
| Payer | Payee | For | Quoted in | Paid in | Burned? |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| End customer | A reseller (BandwidthOS, a VPN, an ISP, a broker) | The reseller's product: transit now, exits in a later phase | The reseller's choice | Any currency the reseller accepts (wire, card, USDC) | No. The protocol never touches fiat or USDC |
| Reseller | Nobody: the subnet pool | The fabric fee: one window of a lane's rate cap and byte quota | Micro-US-dollars (uusd,
USD) per GiB, on the validators' rate card |
TAO, by
SubtensorModule.add_stake_burn from the reseller's own
coldkey |
Yes. The TAO buys alpha from the pool, and that alpha is destroyed in the same call |
| Reseller | Each lane gateway's registered coldkey | The port fee, per window, before the next auction | uusd per GiB, from the
gateway's signed registration, fixed per credit by the card |
TAO, by
Balances.transfer_keep_alive |
No. It is the gateway's revenue |
| The chain's emissions | Nodes, gateways, solvers, validators and the owner | Measured work (§4) | — | Alpha, every 360-block tempo | No |
flowchart LR
Cust["End customers\n(any currency)"]
Res["Resellers\n(BandwidthOS, VPNs, ISPs, brokers)"]
Card["Validator-signed rate card\n(lanes, uusd prices, one TAO/USD reference)"]
Burn["add_stake_burn, signed by the reseller\nTAO buys α from the pool; α destroyed"]
Pool["Subnet pool: TAO in,\nbought α destroyed"]
Em["Emissions: nodes, gateways,\nsolvers, validators, owner"]
GW["Gateways\n(port fee in TAO, per window)"]
Cust --> Res
Card --> Res
Res --> Burn
Res --> GW
Burn --> Pool
Pool --> Em
Three layers, each with one job (ADR-0063 §1). The
protocol publishes the rate card, reads purchases from
the chain and publishes credits, balances and a burn ledger; nobody
operates it and it takes nothing but burned TAO.
Resellers sell to end customers, buy TAO, make
purchases and issue BandwidthVouchers.
Gateways (registered datacenter operators, ADR-0052)
on-ramp and off-ramp traffic, meter it at both ends of a lane and
enforce credits. Currency conversion is the reseller's job. There is
no treasury, no custodian and no protocol fee: at the
protocol level no one receives revenue except gateways, which receive
their own port fees.
The rate card (ADR-0063 §2, amended by ADR-0065 §4).
Each window, validators publish a signed card. A lane is an ordered pair
of gateways run by different operators. v0 sells one class,
best_effort: a byte quota plus a rate cap. For each
lane:
where min_cut is the min-cut between the two gateways
over verified capacity, egress is the egress gateway's
measured throughput, and curve is a published integer
piecewise-linear function that rises as the lane fills. To be
set: the floor and the minimum purchase are calibrated in
uusd before mainnet, and the curve breakpoints and
WHOLESALE_SELLABLE_PPM are PB-49 parameters. None has a
value yet.
Clearing (ADR-0063 §3). Each window's bids clear
once, as a uniform-price batch auction per lane, ranked renewals first,
then by max_price, then by a hash seeded after the cutoff.
New fills pay the higher of the curve at final utilization and the
highest max_price left unfilled for lack of headroom.
Renewals pay the higher of the curve and the new-fill price capped at
WHOLESALE_MAX_RENEWAL_STEP_PPM (proposed 10%) above their
previous price. The price-setting unfilled bid forfeits
WHOLESALE_BID_BOND_PPM (proposed 5%) of its fee. A credit
runs one window at a time, with no fixed term.
A burn is final (ADR-0063 §3, revision 4). Nothing
burned is refunded for unused bytes, a lapse, deregistration or a failed
guard. Balance, held in uusd and owned by the payer
coldkey, comes only from paying above the clearing price, being outbid,
rounding remainders and explicit top-ups, and is spent by later
bids.
Conversion: quoted in dollars, settled in TAO
(ADR-0065 §3). The card for window
carries one reference, tao_usd_ref: the chain's
TaoUsdPrice.accepted read at the window's first block, in
units of
per USD. Every validator reads the same value. A burn of
rao included in window
is credited, rounded in the network's favour, as
Worked example, with ADR-0065's own reference figure: at
$211.00, tao_usd_ref = 211000000000. A burn of
1 TAO
(
rao) is credited
= 211,000,000 uusd, which is $211.00. The credit is fixed
at inclusion; if TAO moves afterwards, it doesn't change. Resellers
carry TAO/USD risk only between buying TAO and burning it, at most two
windows. If the oracle is stale for more than
WHOLESALE_ORACLE_MAX_AGE_BLOCKS (300), the card is
held at the last fresh reference for up to
WHOLESALE_ORACLE_HOLD_WINDOWS (3) windows, then
unavailable. While it is held, new purchases and top-ups aren't
credited, but renewals and balance spends continue. Once it is
unavailable, only balance spends clear, and renewals that need a burn
are suspended, not lapsed. Bittensor's Gamma credits are a later option,
adopted only by a new ADR.
A real burn on testnet 611 (ADR-0063, 2026-11-11): a coldkey
that is not the subnet owner sent one batch_all of
add_stake_burn and a remark. It put 10,000,000 rao (0.01
TAO) into the pool, bought and burned 77,214,706 alpha, moved spot from
0.129362 to 0.129526 TAO per alpha, and paid a transaction fee of
993,533 rao (about 0.001 TAO, fixed per purchase).
Guards for alpha holders (ADR-0063 §3a; values from
the OQ-291 replay of 8 young mainnet subnets,
docs/economics/oq-291-guard-calibration.md). The protocol
can't stop anyone's burn; it controls what it credits, and a burn that
fails a guard is forfeited, never refunded, so evading a guard never
pays. New purchases and top-ups face every guard; renewals face only the
short-horizon band, the slippage cap and the size cap, so customers
already served can't be cut off by a multi-day trend.
| Guard | Parameter | Value |
|---|---|---|
| Reference price: median spot over about 7 days, sampled at blocks chosen after each window | WHOLESALE_REF_WINDOWS /
WHOLESALE_REF_SAMPLES_PER_WINDOW |
140 windows / 4 (proposed) |
Price band: a purchase's
limit at most this far above the reference |
WHOLESALE_PRICE_BAND_PPM |
25% (from OQ-291; was 15%) |
| Volatility gate: closes new purchases when the p90–p10 spread over the reference exceeds it | WHOLESALE_MAX_VOL_PPM |
40% (from OQ-291; was 30%) |
| Short-horizon band: execution price over the 50-block median | WHOLESALE_SHORT_BAND_PPM /
WHOLESALE_SHORT_REF_BLOCKS |
5% / 50 blocks (proposed) |
| Slippage cap: execution over the simulated swap at the parent block | WHOLESALE_MAX_SLIPPAGE_PPM |
2% (proposed) |
| Size cap: one extrinsic's burns as a share of the pool's TAO reserve | WHOLESALE_MAX_BURN_PPM |
1% (proposed, calibrated on testnet) |
| Notice before any economic parameter, the floor or the curve changes | WHOLESALE_PARAM_NOTICE_WINDOWS |
600 windows (about 30 days) |
The OQ-291 replay found that at 25%/40% the guard for new purchases was closed in about 14% of windows over a subnet's first 90 days, and about 7% over days 30 to 90, while still closing 92% of windows that jumped more than 25% above the previous day's median. A subnet's launch month stays about 37% closed under any setting; resellers ride that out on a balance buffer (ADR-0064 §6).
The burn ledger (ADR-0063 §3b). Each window, validators publish one row per burn (payer, TAO in, alpha burned, outcome) and two identities anyone can recompute from the chain: TAO burned = credited + balance created + forfeited + held pending, and credited + balance spent = value of windows held. The company's own wholesale coldkeys are listed in it.
One disclosed asymmetry (ADR-0063 §1, red team L1). Every reseller pays the same clearing price, but a buyer that holds alpha gets back part of its fee through the price rise its own purchase causes. Every buyback works this way; it is disclosed, not fixed.
6.3 What BandwidthOS earns, and what nobody earns (ADR-0063 §6, ADR-0064)
The protocol earns nothing. It holds no money and charges no fee. The fabric fee is burned.
Gateways earn their port fees, paid straight to their registered coldkeys window by window, plus emissions like any node.
Nodes, solvers and validators earn emissions only (§6.1).
BandwidthOS earns a reseller's margin, and nothing from the protocol. It pays the clearing price like every reseller and gets no early access to parameters or data. Protocol revenue never passes through it. For each window, its margin is
where the fabric fee and port fees are set by the card's clearing prices, and its own costs include buying TAO and the transaction fee on each purchase. None of these terms has a published value yet, so the paper gives no figure for it. Under its published treasury policy (ADR-0064 §6, ADR-0063 §6), its alpha comes only from retail margin and sits on hotkeys that never set weights; its holdings are disclosed quarterly; it keeps a balance buffer of a set number of windows; it sells no alpha within
Nwindows (proposed 140, about 7 days) of its own wholesale purchases, and at most 5% a month on an announced schedule. Any corporate buyback it chooses to run is kept out of the fabric burn ledger. Nodes BandwidthOS may run are a reference deployment and are paid like anyone's (§7.2); how that pay sits with the treasury rule is open (OQ-301).
What the old projections covered and the current model doesn't. The 1.1 model's VPN backbone and pay-per-GB exit revenue depend on exits, a later phase. The telemetry feed (§7.1) is a later phase: it has no settlement path in ADR-0063. The repository's historical economic model still assumes the retired buyback and company fee, so this section uses only its emission inputs.
7. BandwidthOS, the Model Home: Commercial Operations & Go-To-Market Workflows
Version 1.2 note (ADR-0062, ADR-0064). Transit Fabric is the open protocol and network; it is not a business. BandwidthOS is the one company the founder runs around it: the first reseller and first gateway, run in public as a working example anyone can copy. Everything it runs to operate (sign-up and accounts, billing adapter, TAO procurement, wholesale buying, voucher issuance, the customer dashboard, gateway operation and runbooks) is published as an open-source reference reseller under Apache-2.0. It has no protocol privilege: it pays the clearing price like every reseller, gets no early access to parameters or data, and gets no peering advantage. It competes on operations, support and brand. It earns a reseller's margin, never protocol revenue (§6.3). Whether the company is an Inc. or an LLC is not yet decided. Nothing in this section is built yet: wholesale is PB-49, the reference reseller PB-50, gateways PB-39.
7.1 Market Positioning: Programmable NaaS & Middle-Mile SD-WAN
While the Transit Fabric Bittensor subnet provides the decentralized incentive, measurement, and settlement layer, enterprise buyers, AI cloud operators, and commercial VPN providers need a standard commercial counterparty. Under ADR-0063 any reseller can be that counterparty on the same terms; BandwidthOS is the first. It positions itself as Programmable Network-as-a-Service (NaaS) and Middle-Mile SD-WAN, at the market intersection of Megaport / PacketFabric (elastic inter-datacenter transit) and Cloudflare Magic WAN / Argo (real-time latency/jitter-optimized routing), backed by the fabric's open supply.
A reseller can sell two core products and, later, two by-products:
- Aggregated Transit on Demand (Elastic Middle-Mile),
planned: Customers establish a single eBGP/IPsec/WireGuard
session into a registered gateway (ADR-0052), or reach it over a
cross-connect or proxy, and gain burst transit across the global fleet
of Mechanism 0 operators. The aim is pricing 30–50% below hyperscale
egress and legacy SD-WAN contracts, because underlying miners are
monetizing sunk 95th-percentile commit headroom. The zero-touch 1U
Transit Fabric Edgeappliance is a later phase. - Near-Real-Time QoS-Based Routing ("BGP with a Brain"),
planned as a product: Powered by Mechanism 1 route solvers and
validator measurement, customers steer traffic across five SLA-enforced
QoS classes (
realtime,low_latency_hd,bulk,economy,resilient) with sub-second BFD failover onto interior-node-disjoint backup paths (520–680 ms measured over the internet in Phase A). - Turnkey Multi-Region VPN Exit & Edge Access, later
phase: Wholesale and retail exit access via registered Exit
Partners (
ADR-0004) authorized byBandwidthVouchers, which are commercial only. - Global Link-Metric Telemetry Feed, later phase: pairwise latency, jitter, packet loss, and link-saturation matrices from validator measurement, for trading desks, CDNs, and WAN observability platforms.
7.2 BandwidthOS Nodes: a Reference Deployment (planned)
Version 1.3 note (founder, 2026-11-13; ADR-0064 §8). This replaces 1.1's company-owned "Anchor Core Routers" and 1.2's hub-node text, including its projection of capacity pay against hub transit cost, which rested on the retired
ALPHA.
BandwidthOS may run nodes, but only as a reference implementation: open-source code and a public example that others copy, so they can run nodes and resell as well. Its nodes:
- Run the same open-source stack as anyone's (for a
kernel node:
bwos-node, FRRoutingbgpd/bfdd, WireGuard and thebwos-node tune-hostFQ/BBRprofile), and how they are deployed is published with the rest of the reference implementation (ADR-0064 §3). - Get no protocol privilege (ADR-0064 §4). They are measured, paid and peered under the same Mechanism 0 rules as every node: self-service peering today, the draw and solver peering plans later (§2.3, §4.2.1). They hold no special role: not an anchor, an ingress point, a route reflector or a peering hub. The fabric is flat eBGP with no route reflectors, and no node or company chooses the topology. A BandwidthOS node is a gateway only if it registers as one under ADR-0052's published criteria, which any datacenter operator can meet.
- Earn emissions like any operator's, and buy like any reseller. What its nodes earn is ordinary operator pay, and when BandwidthOS resells capacity it burns TAO at the same clearing price as everyone else (ADR-0063). Its node UIDs have no special standing and are not separately disclosed (ADR-0064 §8).
Today on testnet, the team runs public nodes that peer with testers' nodes on request (§2.3), and every validator on subnet 611 is the team's own until outside validators join.
7.3 Transaction Clearing & Settlement Workflow (Fiat/USDC to a TAO Burn)
Version 1.2 note (ADR-0063, ADR-0065): this replaces the 1.1 workflow, in which the company bought alpha with customer revenue. Proposed details, pending a red team; not built (PB-49, PB-39).
Enterprise customers never need to custody TAO or or manage Subtensor hotkeys. A reseller such as BandwidthOS clears transactions end-to-end:
- Commercial Invoicing: The customer pays the reseller in any currency it accepts (wire, ACH, card or USDC) under a monthly commit or pay-per-GB agreement.
- Wholesale Purchase: The reseller bids for a lane on
the validators' rate card, priced in US dollars. Its own coldkey signs
one
batch_all:add_stake_burn, burning TAO converted at the window's TAO/USD reference, plus a remark naming the credit. The window clears as a batch auction, and anything paid above the clearing price comes back as a dollar balance. - Credit and Quota Issuance
(
BandwidthVoucher): Validators read the purchase from the chain and publish the credit. The reseller issuesBandwidthVouchers(domain: "bandwidth-voucher") scoped to its customer's keys, which the lane's gateways meter and enforce. - Per-Window Renewal and Port Fees: A credit runs one window at a time, renewed by further bids, and each window's port fee is paid in TAO straight to each lane gateway's registered coldkey.
- Miner Payouts Through Emissions: Validators never pay miners from receipts or vouchers: nodes and solvers are paid in emissions from measured capacity, availability and, once scored, canary carriage, every 360-block tempo. Customer money reaches them through the burn's effect on the subnet's pool, with no accounts-payable process across hundreds of independent operators.
- The Reseller's Margin: What the reseller keeps is its customer revenue less the fabric fees it burned, the port fees it paid and its own costs (§6.3).
7.4 Go-To-Market Sequences & End-to-End User Stories
Version 1.3 note. These sequences are illustrative, with fictional names, and were first written for 1.1. Their contract figures stand. Where a step relied on company-owned anchor routers or on the retired buyback, it follows ADR-0063 and ADR-0064, and 1.3 removes the 1.1 figures that rested on the buyback or on
ALPHA(§6). Sequence 3's appliance and all of Sequence 4 are later phases.
Sequence 1 (Beachhead 1 — Months 1–6): Reference Nodes & Onboarding VPN Providers
- Actors: BandwidthOS (the first reseller and gateway), Lantern VPN (a 40-city crypto-accepting commercial VPN provider), and Ridgeline Hosting (a regional colocation operator with 6 Gbps of idle 95th-percentile transit headroom).
- End-to-End Workflow:
- Reference Nodes: BandwidthOS brings online 6 nodes
(
100 Gbpsaggregate commit) in Ashburn, Chicago, Frankfurt, Amsterdam, Dallas, and Tokyo as a reference deployment (§7.2): open source, published for others to copy, and measured and paid like anyone's. - Pilot Onboarding: BandwidthOS onboards
Lantern VPN onto a 30-day pilot. Lantern runs
bwos-nodeon 10 of its busiest ingress/exit servers, which peer into the fabric by the same process as every node. - Cryptographic SLA Proof
(
PartnerPilotReport): Over 4 weeks, validators probe every route and BandwidthOS generates an automated weeklyPartnerPilotReport(crates/bwos-core/src/validator.rs) comparing Lantern's middle-mile traffic over Transit Fabric (realtimeandlow_latency_hdclasses) against direct public BGP—demonstrating a20–35%reduction in transatlantic p95 RTT and jitter and sub-300 ms BFD failover during carrier brownouts. - Dual-Role Conversion (Customer + Exit Partner):
Lantern signs a
$10,000/monthcommercial backbone contract with BandwidthOS (paid in USDC/USD) to carry inter-city VPN traffic over Transit Fabric, and, in a later phase, registers its 40 regional servers as Transit Fabric Exit Partners (ADR-0004). - Demand Reaches the Subnet: BandwidthOS buys the
wholesale lanes Lantern's traffic needs by burning TAO at the rate
card's clearing price (§7.3). How much of Lantern's
$10,000/monthis burned depends on the card's clearing prices and port fees, which aren't set yet (§6.2); the rest is BandwidthOS's margin and costs (§6.3). Seeing the subnet's emissions and demand, Ridgeline Hosting registers a Mechanism 0 UID, peers its 3 Gbps idle commit into the fabric, and earns capacity emissions. Lantern's paid traffic itself earns no one anything (ADR-0053).
- Reference Nodes: BandwidthOS brings online 6 nodes
(
Sequence 2 (Beachhead 2 — Months 3–9): Distributed AI / Neo-Cloud GPU Cluster Interconnects
- Actors: TensorForge Cloud (a distributed GPU provider operating H100/B200 clusters across Illinois, North Carolina, and Eastern Europe) and Mechanism 1 Route Solvers.
- End-to-End Workflow:
- Problem: TensorForge must synchronize 250 GB model checkpoints every hour between regional datacenters and stream low-latency token inference across nodes, but public BGP suffers from single-path TCP congestion and hyperscale cloud egress fees are prohibitive.
- Peering & QoS Tagging: TensorForge deploys
bwos-nodeon its border gateways (bwos-node tune-host -if eth0enabling 64 MB socket buffers,fqpacing, andBBR), reaches the fabric through a registered gateway (ADR-0052), and tags checkpoint replication asclass = "bulk"( bottleneck bandwidth / latency) and inference streams asclass = "realtime"( jitter). - Capacity-Aware Solver Execution: Mechanism 1
solvers (
routing::solve_capacity_aware) compute multi-commodity flow tables that strip out congested links using quadratic congestion pricing (CONGESTION_SURCHARGE_PPM) and stripe TensorForge's bulk transfers across parallel Mechanism 0 transit paths. - Clearing: TensorForge pays BandwidthOS a monthly
commit + per-TB burst fee in USD; BandwidthOS buys the lanes by burning
TAO and issues
BandwidthVouchers(§7.3).
Sequence
3 (Beachhead 3 — Months 6–18): Enterprise HA WAN
(resilient) & Telemetry Data Buyers
- Actors: Coastline Labs (an enterprise linking three offices and a private compute cage) and QuantPulse (a low-latency financial infrastructure desk).
- End-to-End Workflow:
- Zero-Touch Appliance Deployment (later phase):
Coastline racks a pre-flashed 1U
Transit Fabric Edgeappliance (docs/adr/0009-edge-appliance.md) at each site and enters the 1-linebwos-node claim-codetoken into BandwidthOS's portal. The appliance generates itsfc00::/8identity locally; Coastline's IT team signs theEdgeConfigoff-box (domain: "edge-config"), and no wallet keys ever touch the router. - Interior-Node-Disjoint HA (
resilient): Coastline's inter-site traffic runs underclass = "resilient", which requires Mechanism 1 solvers to provision both a low-latency primary path and an interior-node-disjointbackup_path(BACKUP_INTERIOR_DISJOINT_MULT_PPM = 1,000,000). When an upstream carrier link degrades, BFD (3 × 200 ms) fails traffic over to the disjoint backup path in under a second (measured 520-680 ms over the internet in Phase A; zero dropped TCP sessions is a goal, not measured). - Telemetry Monetization (later phase):
QuantPulse subscribes to a telemetry API
(
$4,000/month), consuming the live, validator-signed matrix of global inter-datacenter latency, jitter, and packet loss across all probed ASNs.
- Zero-Touch Appliance Deployment (later phase):
Coastline racks a pre-flashed 1U
Sequence 4 (later phase): Prosumer Desktop, OpenWrt & "Mine-to-Surf"
- Actors: Maya (a remote systems engineer on macOS and an OpenWrt home router) and a Fleet Aggregator UID.
- End-to-End Workflow (later phase, §5):
- Onboarding: Maya installs the Transit Fabric
desktop client on her Mac (
bwos-client app). Her client derives its/128fc00::/8address and connects to the fabric through an ingress node. - Mine-to-Surf Enrollment (
ADR-0019): Maya signs aFleetEnrollment(commission_ppm <= 20%). While her Mac or OpenWrt router is online, it carries light transit and earns a share of the aggregator's Mechanism 0 emissions. - Exit Access: Her earnings, or exit credits she
buys, back a
BandwidthVoucherthat authorizes traffic at Lantern VPN's exit nodes. The voucher is commercial only and carries no protocol burn. In the client, Maya picks an exit region and routes her Mac's TLS 1.3 and SOCKS5 streams across thefc00::/8fabric to it.
- Onboarding: Maya installs the Transit Fabric
desktop client on her Mac (
8. Security, Privacy & Wire-Obscurity Analysis
8.1 Resistance to Economic & Protocol Attacks
| Threat Vector | Protocol Defense Mechanism | Economic / Verification Outcome |
|---|---|---|
| Self-Dealing / Wash-Trading | Since 1.1, customer traffic is never credited (ADR-0053): paid bytes earn no emissions, so faking or steering them earns nothing. Canary carriage is validator-allocated (ADR-0051) | Zero gain by construction (1.0 measured
0.96x under the retired voucher-burn design) |
| Hop Counter Inflation | Bilateral HopReceipt
co-signing (0.5% tolerance) + multi-hop chain conservation
audit |
Inflating interior hop is deterministically zeroed |
| Missing Middle Receipt | Contiguous path receipt verification | Entire incomplete path segment is zeroed |
| Capacity Over-Claiming | Random 10s saturation capacity tests
(CAP_TEST_PERIOD = 900) +
OVERCLAIM_PENALTY_PPM (20% haircut for 24
windows) |
Over-claiming yields 0.73x
return per real Mbps vs. 1.00x honest |
| Selective Canary Prioritization | Goal, not yet true: canaries still differ from paid flows in source, timing and size (threat model T19, Phase B Task 14); penalizes latency/loss inflation | Dropping customer traffic degrades and zeroes usage credit |
| Solver Copycatting / Sybil | Commit-reveal + EPSILON_ROUTE
(2%) margin + identical gains_ppm vector
deduplication |
Copycat solvers receive 0
Mechanism 1 weight |
| BGP Prefix Hijacking | /128 fc00::/8
IPv6 address is
0xfc || SHA-512(SHA-512(pubkey))[0..15] |
Cryptographically impossible without Ed25519 private key |
| Exit Node SSRF / Local Egress | Strict target IP validation
(is_forbidden_egress_ip blocks RFC 1918, loopback,
link-local 169.254.0.0/16, fc00::/8, and
IPv4-mapped IPv6 ::ffff:0:0/96) |
Returns HTTP 403 Forbidden
before socket connect |
8.2 Wire-Level Privacy ("Entry Exit") — later phase
Version 1.2 note: these properties concern client traffic through exits, a later phase. Nothing on testnet 611 leaves the overlay. Item 2 is corrected per ADR-0040: Transit Fabric makes no claim that node links resist DPI or blocking.
Compared to traditional single-hop VPNs (where a single server sees both the user's residential IP and their destination traffic, and whose IP address is publicly cataloged on commercial VPN blocklists), Transit Fabric's flat eBGP architecture would provide these structural privacy properties:
- Compartmentalized Metadata: The ingress
node knows the client's outer IP address but only sees packets
destined for an
fc00::/8exit address. Interior Transit Nodes see only encryptedfc00::/8 -> fc00::/8backbone frames. The Exit Node connects to the public destination (:443), but sees only the client'sfc00::/8overlay address—never the client's physical IP—while the payload remains end-to-end TLS 1.3 encrypted from the client's OS. - Not on exit blocklists (corrected in 1.2): A Mechanism 0 transit node never makes outbound connections to websites, so its address doesn't appear on commercial VPN exit blocklists. That is all it gives. The entry connection is WireGuard today, which DPI middleboxes can identify and block, so Transit Fabric claims no censorship resistance for it (ADR-0040).
- Wire fingerprint (corrected 2026-11-01): datacenter
backbone links that run IPsec ESP (
RFC 4303) or MACsec look like enterprise interconnects. WireGuard links, which every home and no-root node uses, are easy to identify and don't share that property (ADR-0040).
9. Empirical Evaluation & Multi-Region Benchmarks
9.1
50-Window Adversarial Incentive Simulation (bwos-sim)
We evaluated Mechanism 0 and Mechanism 1 over 50 consecutive windows
(make sim) across 9 competing operator archetypes.
Measuring score share per unit of real physical Mbps
supplied (normalized to Honest = 1.00x), every
adversarial strategy underperforms honest participation:
| Operator Strategy | Real Capacity Supplied | 50-Window Mean Score Share | Efficiency vs. Honest
(1.00x) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Honest Operator | 1,000 Mbps | 20.69% | 1.00x
(Baseline) |
| Self-Dealer (Wash-Trader) | 1,000 Mbps | 19.77% | 0.96x
(1.0 design, penalized by voucher burn & cap; since 1.1 paid
traffic earns nothing) |
| Receipt Inflator | 1,000 Mbps | 14.23% | 0.69x
(inflated hop chains zeroed) |
| Over-Claimer ( fake claim) | 1,000 Mbps | 15.14% | 0.73x
(OVERCLAIM_PENALTY_PPM haircut) |
| Flaky Operator ( uptime) | 1,000 Mbps | 11.49% | 0.56x
(quadratic UPTIME_EXP = 2 penalty) |
| Canary-Gaming Operator | 1,000 Mbps | 14.23% | 0.69x
(
latency/loss gate) |
| Sybil Operator (split across UIDs) | 1,000 Mbps | 20.52% | 0.99x
(linear invariance; extra registration cost) |
9.2 Live Multi-Region Hardware-in-the-Loop (HIL) Benchmarks
Version 1.2 note: these runs used the 1.0 prototype client and exit path. Client access and exits are a later phase, so Table 2 measures the overlay prototype, not a service available today.
We deployed bwos-node across three live cloud datacenter
regions—US-Central (US-IL-1, Chicago,
Illinois), US-East (US-NC-1, Raleigh,
North Carolina), and Europe (EU-RO-1,
Cluj-Napoca, Romania)—and connected a live macOS desktop client
(bwos-client app, fce0:7248:...) over Wi-Fi
(en1) using Layer-4 HTTPS CONNECT
(127.0.0.1:7781) and SOCKS5h
(127.0.0.1:7782) system routing.
Table
1: In-Datacenter bwos-node Engine Overhead
(US-IL-1)
| Metric | Measured Value | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Control-Plane + Receipt Verification RTT () | 0.164 ms
(147 µs min) |
50 consecutive queries on
US-IL-1 (Linux 6.8.0-79-generic) |
| Control-Plane + Receipt Verification RTT () | 1.157 ms |
Includes JSON canonicalization & Ed25519 verification |
| Node Direct Egress Line Rate (50 MB TLS 1.3) | 766.8 Mbps
(0.522 s) |
Sustained TLS 1.3 stream to Cloudflare CDN |
Table
2: End-to-End Multi-Region Overlay Performance
(macOS Client ──► Ingress ──► BGP Transit ──► Exit ──► Internet)
| Selected Regional Exit | Overlay Hops | Verified Public Egress IP & Cloudflare PoP | Signed ClientReceipt +
Co-Signed HopReceipt RTT
() |
End-to-End TLS 1.3 Handshake
(:443) |
Sustained 10 MB TLS 1.3 Stream (to macOS Wi-Fi) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
US-Central (US-IL-1 ·
Illinois) |
2 hops | (address redacted)
(US · PoP: MSP) |
314.9 ms
(313.3 ms min) |
446.7 ms | 53.90 Mbps
(1.48 s) |
Europe (EU-RO-1 ·
Romania) |
4 hops | (address redacted)
(RO · PoP: FRA) |
759.6 ms
(755.4 ms min) |
824.5 ms | 35.72 Mbps
(2.24 s) |
US-East (US-NC-1 ·
North Carolina) |
3 hops | (address redacted)
(US · PoP: IAD) |
539.2 ms
(441.7 ms min) |
569.2 ms | 27.69 Mbps
(2.89 s) |
10. Normative Protocol Parameters
| Parameter | Default Value | Normative Meaning |
|---|---|---|
ALPHA |
700_000 ppm
() |
1.0 value. Replaced by W,
which is 1_000_000 (capacity only) until PB-38's
canary-carriage term lands; the paid-traffic step-down is retired
(ADR-0053, PB-40) |
UPTIME_EXP |
2 |
Exponent on probe availability in capacity scoring |
W_PAID / W_FREE
/ W_CANARY |
1_000_000 /
250_000 / 100_000 ppm |
1.0 traffic class weights. Paid and free bytes are never credited since 1.1 (ADR-0053); the canary-carriage term is set by PB-38 |
USAGE_SHARE_CAP |
250_000 ppm
() |
Maximum usage share any single UID may capture |
RECEIPT_TOLERANCE_PPM |
5_000 ppm
() |
Maximum allowed counter divergence between adjacent hops |
CAP_TOLERANCE_PPM |
100_000 ppm
() |
Allowed shortfall in random saturation capacity tests |
OVERCLAIM_PENALTY_PPM |
200_000 ppm
() |
Haircut below measured capacity when a node over-claims |
EPSILON_ROUTE |
20_000 ppm
() |
Required improvement margin to unseat the incumbent route table |
LADDER_N /
LADDER_DECAY_PPM |
8 / 500_000
ppm |
Mechanism 1 ladder: rungs and each rung's
weight relative to the one above (replaces
WINNER_SHARE) |
CLONE_DISTANCE_PPM |
20_000 ppm
() |
A table this close to an earlier-committed one scores 0 |
OVERLAY_BASE_ASN |
4_200_000_000 |
Base RFC 6996 4-byte private ASN for
fc00::/8 eBGP peers |
MAX_REALTIME_JITTER_US |
5_000 µs
() |
Hard jitter SLA gate for
realtime routes |
MAX_REALTIME_LOSS_PPM |
5_000 ppm
() |
Hard packet loss SLA gate for
realtime routes |
PROTOCOL_VOUCHER_BURN_PPM |
50_000 ppm
() |
Retired in 1.1 (ADR-0053): vouchers are commercial only and carry no protocol burn |
MAX_AGGREGATOR_COMMISSION_PPM |
200_000 ppm
() |
Later phase. Maximum commission a Fleet Aggregator UID can deduct from sub-nodes |
SENSE_MAX_RUNS_PER_DAY |
3 |
System One runs a skill at most this often per symptom code in 24 hours, then escalates (ADR-0067) |
FAULT_REPORTS_PER_WINDOW |
4 |
Most fault reports a node may send per window; validators' stores drop the rest (ADR-0067) |
Peering parameters (PEER_CHANGES_PER_WINDOW,
PEER_EXPLORE, PEER_SUSPEND_WINDOWS, the draw
size and MAX_PEERS) are set by their ADRs and are not yet
fixed. Wholesale parameters (ADR-0063, ADR-0065) are proposed; §6.2
lists the guard values, and the floor, curve and minimum purchase are
calibrated before mainnet.
11. Conclusion
Transit Fabric demonstrates that an open, decentralized network does
not have to choose between cryptographic verifiability and datacenter
line-rate performance. By deriving every node's /128
fc00::/8 IPv6 identity from its Ed25519 key, flattening the
control plane into end-to-end eBGP with competitive Mechanism 1 route
solvers that will also plan the fabric's peering, isolating public
internet egress to registered exit partners and gateways
(ADR-0004, ADR-0052), enforcing conservation
of flow via co-signed HopReceipts, paying nodes only in
emissions for what validators measure, and letting buyers burn TAO for
capacity with no treasury in between, Transit Fabric aims to turn idle
global transit capacity into a programmable, institutional-grade
backbone. Its transit and route-solving core runs today on Bittensor
testnet, subnet 611.