Transit Fabric releases

Taken from the Transit Fabric source repository at commit 10a682c (10a682c933278f64f47f65e25711cd66d74552ac, main), file docs/whitepaper.md. Links into the private source tree are shown as plain text.

Transit Fabric: A Cryptographically Verifiable fc00::/8 eBGP Transit Fabric and Multi-Commodity Routing Market on Bittensor

Version: 1.3 (2026-11-13). Replaces 1.2, published earlier the same day.

Status labels. Every feature in this paper carries one of three labels:

Launch is transit (Mechanism 0) and route solving (Mechanism 1) only. Transit Fabric is not yet registered on mainnet, so nothing described here runs there.

What changed in version 1.3

These changes follow the founder's answers to the 1.2 review on 2026-11-13.

  1. Economics rewritten to the current model (§6; ADR-0053, ADR-0063, ADR-0064, ADR-0065). Removed: the 1.1 model's 80/20 company buyback, the company's 20% fee on protocol revenue, the ALPHA step-down tied to it, the subsidy ratios, and the three-year revenue, market-cap and company-income projections. §6 now says who pays whom, in what unit and what is burned, with ADR-0063's rate-card and clearing formulas, ADR-0065's TAO/USD conversion and a worked example, and the burn guards' values from the OQ-291 calibration. No new projection replaces the old ones.
  2. How BandwidthOS earns (§6.3, §7). A reseller's margin, never protocol revenue. The protocol holds no money and charges no fee.
  3. BandwidthOS may run nodes, as a reference deployment (founder, 2026-11-13; ADR-0064 §8; §7.2). Open-source code and a public example for others to copy, with no protocol privilege and no special role. The hub-node projection and every "anchor" role are removed. How these nodes' emissions sit with the company's treasury rule is open (OQ-301).
  4. Go-to-market sequences (§7.4). The contract figures stay. The 1.1 buyback figure and the capacity-pay projection in Sequence 1 are removed; the BFD failover change in §7.1 stays.
  5. Change notes, abstract and §4.1 brought in line: 1.1 item 7 and 1.2 items 3 and 5 point to the new §6 and §7.2, and §4.1's step 5 no longer describes the ALPHA step-down as current. The company form is still not decided (Inc. or LLC).
  6. Owner share, BandwidthOS's nodes and telemetry (founder, 2026-11-13; ADR-0064 §8, OQ-301 closed). The subnet owner's 18% emission share is the owner's own, not BandwidthOS revenue. BandwidthOS's nodes are a reference example: their pay is ordinary operator pay, BandwidthOS burns TAO like every reseller, and its node UIDs are not separately disclosed. The telemetry feed is a later phase.

What changed in version 1.2

These decisions were made between 2026-11-08 and 2026-11-13 and are reflected in the sections below. Where a section still describes an older design, it says so.

  1. Route solvers also discover peers: the peering plan (System One autonomous peering design, approved 2026-11-12; abstract, §2.3, §4.2.1). Solvers compete on a peering plan, the adjacency set for the next window, alongside their route tables, and validators score plans and attest the winner by quorum. Node and solver RTTs are hints that can only narrow a node's placement. Planned, not built: its two ADRs and an incentive red team come first. Today peering is self-service.
  2. System One on the launch path (ADR-0067; §2.4). fabric-sense ships first on kernel, no-root and container nodes, as rules only. Two jobs are live on testnet 611: rebuilding a stale validator-set anchor, and automatic fault reports that are never a scoring input. bwos doctor, bwos report and an agent skill share one symptom registry. The model, the skill library and routers come later. This narrows 1.1 item 6.
  3. The buyer burns; nobody holds the money (ADR-0063, proposed, revision 5; the founder chose burn on 2026-11-11; §6.2, §7.3). A reseller buys wholesale capacity by calling add_stake_burn, which buys the subnet's alpha from the pool and destroys it in the same call, signed by the buyer's own coldkey. There is no protocol treasury and no custodian. This replaces 1.1 item 2's "the company converts it to TAO and buys alpha" and the 1.1 80/20 buyback; 1.3 removes the projections built on it (§6). Details pending red team and simulation; not built (PB-49).
  4. Wholesale is quoted in US dollars and settled by burning TAO (ADR-0065, accepted in principle on 2026-11-12, details proposed pending a red team; §6.2, §7.3). Each window's rate card carries one TAO/USD reference read from the chain at a fixed block. Bittensor's Gamma credits are a later option, not part of v0.
  5. BandwidthOS is the "model home" (ADR-0064; §7). BandwidthOS is the one company around Transit Fabric: the first reseller and first gateway. Everything it runs is open source, it has no protocol privilege, and it pays the same clearing price as any reseller. Its own alpha comes only from retail margin and sits on hotkeys that never set weights. This replaces 1.1 item 7's framing and §7.2's company-owned anchor routers with special roles. (1.3: BandwidthOS may run nodes only as a reference deployment, §7.2.)
  6. The name is Transit Fabric (ADR-0062, ADR-0066; title and throughout). Transit Fabric is the open protocol and network; BandwidthOS is only the company. Code keeps the bwos names until a trademark search before mainnet. The project's old name is retired everywhere.
  7. Inline node bindings (ADR-0058; §2.1). Live. A hotkey binds up to 7 nodes inside its own on-chain commitment, with no server to publish from.
  8. Linking with a browser wallet (ADR-0054; §2.1). Live. A static page lets Talisman, SubWallet or Polkadot.js sign the binding, so no hotkey file sits on the operator's machine.
  9. Probe sessions keyed by the node key (ADR-0061; §2.1). Live. A node's probe sessions use the X25519 form of its node key, so no operator hands WireGuard bindings to validators.
  10. Proof of measurement work (ADR-0055, proposed, scoring gated off; §4.1). Validators would be paid a capped slice for measurement bytes nodes signed for, so measuring pays better than copying.
  11. Peer-load capacity tests (ADR-0056, proposed, scoring gated off; §3.3). Other operators' nodes make the load, with hidden validator slices, about 3 random calls a day with a reputation bond. If adopted, this replaces 1.1 item 3's "about 20 full-rate tests a day" and ADR-0039's validator-pushed team tests.
  12. Locational scarcity pricing (ADR-0057, proposed, gated off; §4.1). Capacity would pay more where it is scarce relative to demand, with placement from validator RTTs that a node can only make look farther, never closer.
  13. Sharded solving (ADR-0059, proposed, gated off; §4.2.2). Solving split by traffic class and destination region, with a fixed published merge of shard winners.
  14. Launch scope (docs/launch-stages.md; §5, §7, §8.2). VPN exits, "Mine-to-Surf", fleet aggregator vouchers and the Transit Fabric Edge appliance are later phases, off the launch path. Registered gateways (ADR-0052) are planned before mainnet. §8.2 no longer claims node links resist DPI (ADR-0040).

What changed in version 1.1

These decisions were made on 2026-11-06 and are reflected in the sections below. Where a section still describes the older design, it says so. Version 1.2 revises some of them: item 2 by 1.2 items 3 and 4, item 3 by item 11 (proposed), item 4 by items 3 and 5, item 6 by item 2, and item 7 by item 5. Version 1.3 removes the projections built on item 2's buyback (§6).

  1. Unearned weight goes to a disclosed first-party UID, not a burn or recycle UID (§4.2; scoring.md §Unearned weight and the first-party UID). Version 1.0 sent the reference solver's share to a burn UID. That was dropped: the usual way to burn on Bittensor is to weight the owner's own hotkey, which the chain penalises by cutting the subnet's TAO share.
    • Routing (Mechanism 1): unearned weight goes to a public first-party UID on a separate coldkey, and the amount is reported every window. Unearned weight means the reference solver's share, or everything when no solver scores. It shrinks as outside solvers beat the reference solver by more than EPSILON_ROUTE (2%).
    • Transit (Mechanism 0): unearned weight goes to no one. If no node has proven capacity in a window, validators set no transit weights at all.
  2. Nodes are paid only in emissions, and customer traffic is checked, never credited (ADR-0053; §3.2, §4.1). Customers pay the company in USDC. The company converts it to TAO and buys alpha. (Revised in 1.2: no company sits in the middle. A reseller burns TAO for wholesale capacity with add_stake_burn, which buys alpha and destroys it, ADR-0063 and ADR-0065.) Vouchers, payments and client receipts are commercial metering, never a scoring input, so faking or steering "paid" traffic earns nothing. Mishandling customer traffic can only lower a node's score.
  3. An always-on canary stream plus random full-rate bursts proves transit (ADR-0051; §3.3). Validators keep a low-rate canary stream through every node, on routes they allocate, checked at each hop. Frequent random full-rate tests catch burst-rented capacity.
  4. Buyback alpha never becomes validator power (ADR-0053, OQ-105). The company holds the alpha it buys on hotkeys that never set weights, and that stake counts for nothing in measurement. (Revised in 1.2: wholesale burns leave no alpha to hold. BandwidthOS's own alpha comes only from retail margin, under the same rule, ADR-0064 §6.)
  5. Gateways (ADR-0052; §7). Registered datacenter operators can on-ramp customers over BGP, cross-connects or a proxy. They can off-ramp to a customer's own network, or to allowlisted public destinations, so the customer's far end needs no Transit Fabric software. Ordinary transit nodes still never egress.
  6. One System One sidecar on every node, with a public skill library learned from the fleet (ADR-0047, ADR-0048, ADR-0050).
  7. The operating company is BandwidthOS (Inc. or LLC, not yet decided). (1.3: it earns a reseller's margin, never protocol revenue, §6.3.)

Code: a Rust workspace (bwos-core, bwos-net, bwos-node, bwos-solver, bwos-validator, bwos-probe, bwos-chain, bwos-cli, bwos-client, bwos-sim). Code identifiers keep the bwos prefix until the trademark search before mainnet (ADR-0062, ADR-0066). Transit Fabric is the protocol and the network; BandwidthOS is a separate company, its first reseller (ADR-0064).


Abstract

The global internet backbone suffers from two structural inefficiencies: (1) stranded physical capacity, where datacenter and hosting operators purchase committed 95th-percentile transit and leave 30–60% of their committed headroom idle, and (2) performance-blind routing, where the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) selects paths by Autonomous System (AS) hop count and bilateral billing policy rather than real-time latency, jitter, packet loss, or link saturation. Hyperscalers (Google B4, Meta Express Backbone, Cloudflare Argo) solved these problems internally using private Software-Defined Wide Area Networks (SD-WANs) and centralized Multi-Commodity Flow (MCF) traffic-engineering solvers, but those capabilities remain locked inside proprietary corporate backbones. Meanwhile, first-generation decentralized bandwidth and VPN networks failed to capture institutional datacenter supply due to exit-node abuse liability, trivial self-dealing (wash-trading) of byte counters, and userspace cryptographic bottlenecks.

We present Transit Fabric, a Bittensor subnet that turns committed datacenter and prosumer edge bandwidth into an open, cryptographically verifiable Layer-3/Layer-4 transit fabric. Every node and client in Transit Fabric derives a deterministic, unforgeable /128 IPv6 Unique Local Address (fc00::/8) directly from its Ed25519 public key, forming a flat, zero-registry eBGP overlay (ASN 4200000000+) over WireGuard links: kernel WireGuard on kernel nodes, and userspace WireGuard on nodes that run without root. IPsec ESP (RFC 4303) and IEEE 802.1AE MACsec backbone links are planned for later. To align incentives without a central coordinator, Transit Fabric splits Bittensor emissions across two specialized mechanisms: Mechanism 0 (mechid=0) rewards transit operators for verified bottleneck capacity and conservation-of-flow traffic delivery, while Mechanism 1 (mechid=1) runs a continuous tournament among route solvers that compute capacity-aware, multi-class (realtime, low_latency_hd, bulk, economy, resilient) route tables. Solvers will also discover peers: in the planned design, they compete on a peering plan, the set of links the fabric runs next window, which validators score and attest by quorum, so no node or company chooses the topology. Transit nodes never egress to the public internet; only registered exit partners and registered gateways do (ADR-0004, ADR-0052). Nodes are paid only in emissions: on testnet today for uptime and capacity proven by validator tests, and, once the designed canary stream is scored, for carriage of a validator-allocated canary stream checked at every hop (ADR-0051). Customer traffic is checked, never credited (ADR-0053), so wash-trading earns nothing, while forwarding stays at kernel line rate. Customer money reaches the subnet by a burn the buyer makes itself: a reseller buys wholesale capacity, quoted in US dollars, by burning TAO into the subnet's pool, so no treasury or company holds it and the protocol charges no fee (ADR-0063, proposed; ADR-0065). BandwidthOS, the first reseller, earns only its retail margin (ADR-0064). We validate the protocol through a 50-window adversarial game-theoretic simulator, live transatlantic multi-region deployments across North America and Europe, and a public test network on Bittensor testnet, subnet 611.


1. Introduction & Motivation

1.1 The Stranded Datacenter Transit Opportunity

Institutional datacenter operators, bare-metal cloud providers, and regional colocation facilities purchase upstream IP transit on fixed monthly commitments (typically billed at the 95th percentile of 5-minute traffic samples over 10 Gbps, 40 Gbps, or 100 Gbps ports). To survive diurnal traffic peaks and DDoS bursts without incurring punitive overage rates, operators provision substantial headroom that sits idle for the majority of the billing cycle. Because the commit is already sunk, the marginal cost to an operator of carrying additional overlay transit traffic below their 95th-percentile commit is near zero.

1.2 The Pathology of Public Internet BGP

Even when physical fiber paths between two regions are uncongested, public internet BGP routinely selects suboptimal routes:

Hyperscalers solved this by treating all of their datacenters as nodes in a single flat graph controlled by a traffic-engineering solver (such as Google's B4 and Cloudflare's Magic WAN). Transit Fabric brings this exact architecture to an open, permissionless market of independent operators.

1.3 Why First-Generation Decentralized Bandwidth Networks Failed

Prior attempts at tokenized bandwidth markets and decentralized VPNs (dVPNs) encountered three fatal failure modes:

  1. The Exit Liability Trap: Legacy dVPNs required every bandwidth provider to act as a public internet exit node. When an anonymous user routed abusive traffic (DMCA violations, credential stuffing, or port scanning) through a node, the hosting operator received abuse complaints and risked immediate upstream BGP session termination. Consequently, institutional datacenter operators refused to participate, leaving legacy dVPNs with unreliable residential proxies.
  2. The Wash-Trading Death Spiral: Protocols that rewarded miners proportional to "bytes relayed" without route-assignment enforcement or burn-backed demand verification were immediately gamed. Miners spun up two colluding nodes in the same datacenter rack and transmitted gigabits per second of synthetic loop traffic to capture 99% of token emissions.
  3. Userspace Mixnet Bottlenecks: Privacy mixnets that wrap every packet in multi-layer userspace cryptography (e.g., Sphinx packet formats) incur severe CPU and serialization overhead, reducing throughput to a few megabits per second and adding hundreds of milliseconds of latency—rendering them unusable for institutional transit or daily desktop networking.

Transit Fabric resolves all three failure modes at the protocol layer:


2. System Architecture & Cryptographic Identity

The diagram shows the launch path (Mechanism 0, Mechanism 1 and validators) and, dashed, the later-phase client and exit layers.

flowchart LR
    subgraph Edge["Client & Edge Layer (later phase)"]
        C["bwos-client (macOS / Windows / OpenWrt)\nEd25519 Key -> fc00::/8 (/128)"]
    end

    subgraph Mech0["Mechanism 0: Transit Fabric (fc00::/8 eBGP over WireGuard)"]
        I["Ingress Node\n(WireGuard + HopReceipt)"]
        T1["Transit Node A\n(kernel or no-root, eBGP + System One)"]
        T2["Transit Node B\n(kernel or no-root, eBGP + System One)"]
    end

    subgraph ExitLayer["Exit Partners & Gateways (ADR-0004, ADR-0052; not on testnet)"]
        E["Registered Exit or Gateway\n(egress for paid, allowlisted traffic)"]
        W["Public Internet\n(TLS 1.3 / TCP / UDP)"]
    end

    subgraph Control["Validators & Mechanism 1 Solvers"]
        S["Route Solvers (mechid=1)\nRoute tables; peering plans (planned)"]
        V["Validators (bwos-validator + bwos-probe)\nProbe Sessions + Capacity Tests + Subtensor Weights"]
    end

    C -. "1. Client traffic (later phase)" .-> I
    I -- "2. eBGP Assigned Path\n+ Co-Signed HopReceipt" --> T1
    T1 -- "3. eBGP Assigned Path\n+ Co-Signed HopReceipt" --> T2
    T2 -. "4. Co-Signed HopReceipt" .-> E
    E -. "5. Public Egress (:443)" .-> W
    S -- "Commit-Reveal RouteTable\n(+ PeeringPlan, planned)" --> V
    V -- "Attested RouteTable\n(+ PeeringPlan, planned)" --> Mech0
    V -- "Probes and Capacity Tests" --> Mech0

2.1 Separation of Network Identity and Economic Identity

Transit Fabric enforces a strict cryptographic boundary between a machine's network identity and an operator's economic identity (docs/specs/identity.md):

Key Type Algorithm Storage Location Protocol Role
Node Key Ed25519 (RFC 8032) Node / Appliance (~/.bwos/node.key, 0600) Network identity; derives fc00::/8 IPv6 address; signs HopReceipts, WgBindings, the node's consent and its fault reports. Its X25519 form keys the node's probe sessions (ADR-0061)
WireGuard Key X25519 (RFC 7748) Node / Client (~/.bwos/wg.key, 0600) Ephemeral/rotatable tunnel transport key bound via signed WgBinding
Operator Hotkey sr25519 (Subtensor) Off-box Operator Wallet (browser wallet or CLI) Economic identity (UID); signs NodeBindings and CapacityDeclarations, or commits an inline binding
Client Key Ed25519 (RFC 8032) End-user device (~/.bwos/client.key, 0600) Later phase. Derives client fc00::/8 address; signs ClientReceipts and FleetEnrollments

Appliances and transit servers never hold a Bittensor hotkey, and System One never reads a key or signs anything (Invariant 5, ADR-0067). Each node signs a consent naming the hotkey it may be bound to, and delivers it to validators over its own probe session. An operator then links nodes to their Bittensor UID in one of two ways:

Either way, the operator can sign with a browser wallet (Talisman, SubWallet or Polkadot.js) on a static "Link with your wallet" page, with no hotkey file on their machine (live, ADR-0054), or with the bwos bind command. A node counts only in a binding whose hotkey it has consented to, so listing someone else's node gains nothing. A node that has consented to two hotkeys whose bindings both survive counts for neither (docs/specs/identity.md, Binding resolution).

2.2 Zero-Registry Cryptographic IPv6 Addressing (fc00::/8)

On the public internet, participating in BGP requires acquiring an Autonomous System Number (ASN) and IP prefix from a Regional Internet Registry (ARIN, RIPE, APNIC) and maintaining RPKI Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs).

In Transit Fabric, every node and client deterministically derives a unique /128 IPv6 address inside the RFC 4193 Unique Local Address (fc00::/8) space directly from its 32-byte Ed25519 public key pk\text{pk}:

digest=SHA-512(SHA-512(pk))\text{digest} = \text{SHA-512}\!\left(\text{SHA-512}(\text{pk})\right)

addr128=𝟶𝚡𝚏𝚌∥digest[0..15]\text{addr}_{128} = \texttt{0xfc} \;\|\; \text{digest}[0..15]

This construction provides three critical properties:

  1. Zero Key Grinding: Unlike CJDNS (which requires brute-force CPU grinding until a double-SHA-512 hash begins with 0xfc), Transit Fabric prepends the 0xfc ULA prefix byte to the first 15 bytes (120 bits) of the double-SHA-512 digest. Key generation takes less than 50 microseconds on any CPU while providing 21202^{120} collision resistance.
  2. Impossible BGP Prefix Hijacking: Because the /128 IPv6 address is a one-way cryptographic function of pk\text{pk}, no node on the overlay can originate or spoof a route for fcxx:... without possessing the corresponding Ed25519 private key.
  3. Universal Peer Parity: Every participant—whether a 100 Gbps core router in Frankfurt, a cloud VM in Illinois, or a macOS laptop on Wi-Fi—speaks the exact same fc00::/8 addressing scheme.

2.3 Flattened eBGP Control Plane and Kernel Data Plane

Rather than inventing a custom routing protocol, Transit Fabric treats every node as a first-class datacenter router speaking standard eBGP and BFD over point-to-point encrypted links. Two node kinds speak the same protocol, and both are live on testnet 611 (ADR-0033):

Both kinds share these properties:

A node is paid for capacity only when it has a data plane: a BGP session with at least one node of another UID (live). Which nodes peer is therefore part of the network's design, not each node's private choice.

2.4 System One: the node's own watchdog (ADR-0067)

System One (fabric-sense) is signed code that runs beside every node and acts in the fabric's interest by following rules anyone can check. It holds no key and signs nothing; where a step needs a key or a human, it says exactly what to do.


3. Cryptographic Accounting & Conservation of Flow

A decentralized transit market is only as strong as its resistance to fabricated traffic. Transit Fabric enforces conservation of flow across every multi-hop path using four cryptographic primitives serialized in strict canonical JSON (docs/specs/encoding.md: lexicographically sorted UTF-8 keys, no whitespace, integer-only numbers, and domain-separated signatures over "BWOS-v0/" || domain || "\0" || canonical_bytes).

3.1 Adjacent Co-Signed HopReceipts

Every RECEIPT_INTERVAL (30 s), each pair of adjacent nodes (u,d)(u, d) on an active path exchanges and co-signs cumulative byte counters for the current window ww across three accounting classes (paid, free, canary):

{
  "v": 0,
  "window": 1234,
  "seq": 17,
  "up": "<upstream_node_pubkey_hex>",
  "down": "<downstream_node_pubkey_hex>",
  "bytes": { "paid": 123456789, "free": 0, "canary": 4567890 },
  "sig_up": "<ed25519_hex>",
  "sig_down": "<ed25519_hex>"
}
  1. Monotonicity: Within a window ww, byte counters for each class MUST be monotonically non-decreasing with sequence number seq.
  2. Bilateral Tolerance Gate: Upstream node uu proposes its cumulative transmitted bytes and signs sig_up (domain hop-receipt). Downstream node dd compares uu's proposed counts against its own received byte counters. If the discrepancy is within RECEIPT_TOLERANCE_PPM (5,000 ppm=0.5%5{,}000\text{ ppm} = 0.5\%), dd appends sig_down. Otherwise, dd counter-proposes its own lower counts. Unilateral (single-signed) receipts earn zero credit.
  3. Multi-Hop Chain Conservation Check: Given an assigned route n0→n1→n2→…→nkn_0 \to n_1 \to n_2 \to \dots \to n_k, validators verify the chain of highest-seq co-signed receipts (n0,n1),(n1,n2),…,(nk−1,nk)(n_0, n_1), (n_1, n_2), \dots, (n_{k-1}, n_k):
    • If any interior hop nin_i's reported bytes exceed both its upstream receipt (ni−1,ni)(n_{i-1}, n_i) and downstream receipt (ni,ni+1)(n_i, n_{i+1}) by more than RECEIPT_TOLERANCE_PPM, hop nin_i is flagged for inflation and its credit on that path is zeroed.
    • If any interior receipt (ni−1,ni)(n_{i-1}, n_i) is missing, the entire multi-hop chain is zeroed for that window segment.
    • Across diamond or DAG topologies where multiple routes traverse a shared bottleneck link (na,nb)(n_a, n_b), validators aggregate flow conservation across the union of assigned routes so legitimate shared hops are never falsely penalized (crates/bwos-core/src/validator.rs).

3.2 Boundary Attestation: ClientReceipts and BandwidthVouchers

Superseded for scoring by ADR-0053 (version 1.1). Client receipts and vouchers remain commercial metering: quota, billing, and destination allowlists for gateways. They are never a scoring input. A colluding path gains nothing by co-signing fake paid bytes, because paid bytes earn no emissions. The 1.0 text below describes the retired design and is kept for reference. Its code paths are removed in roadmap PB-40.

While HopReceipts prevent interior nodes from inflating counters relative to their neighbors, what stops an entire colluding path n0→n1→n2n_0 \to n_1 \to n_2 from co-signing fake paid bytes?

Transit Fabric closes this boundary loop with two end-to-end mechanisms (ADR-0016, ADR-0019):

  1. Client Receipts (client-receipt): The end-user client (bwos-client) signs cumulative delivery receipts binding (window, client, ingress, egress, bytes). Validators verify that paid bytes claimed at the ingress hop (n0,n1)(n_0, n_1) are covered by valid ClientReceipts within RECEIPT_TOLERANCE_PPM. Any uncovered paid bytes are automatically downgraded to free (W_FREE = 250,000 ppm vs. W_PAID = 1,000,000 ppm).
  2. Burn-Backed Bandwidth Vouchers (bandwidth-voucher): To qualify as paid traffic (W_PAID), a session must be authorized by a BandwidthVoucher signed by a registered Exit Partner or Fleet Aggregator:
    • Issuing a BandwidthVoucher requires a mandatory minimum protocol burn/fee of PROTOCOL_VOUCHER_BURN_PPM (50,000 ppm=5%50{,}000\text{ ppm} = 5\%, with 10%10\% default in simulation).
    • Because any miner attempting to mint vouchers to wash-trade their own transit nodes forfeits the protocol burn upfront and must share Mechanism 0 emissions with all honest capacity and usage on the subnet, self-dealing is strictly negative-EV.

3.3 Unannounced Canary Probes & Random Saturation Capacity Tests

Updated in version 1.1 (ADR-0051, ADR-0053):

Specified in Task 14 and PB-38. The 1.0 text below describes the earlier shared, computable schedule.

Status in version 1.2:

Validators run bwos-probe daemons from distributed vantage points using a shared, deterministic probe schedule seeded by the Subtensor block hash (docs/specs/measurement.md):


4. Dual-Mechanism Incentive Design

All scoring in Transit Fabric (crates/bwos-core/src/scoring/mod.rs) is implemented in 100% deterministic integer fixed-point arithmetic (u128/i128 parts-per-million, 106 ppm=1.010^6\text{ ppm} = 1.0, with floor division and deterministic BTreeMap UID ordering). Given identical committed inputs, every honest validator on any CPU architecture computes byte-identical Subtensor weight vectors.

4.1 Mechanism 0 (mechid=0): Physical Transit Capacity & Verified Usage

For each transit operator UID uu in window ww:

  1. Verified Fleet Capacity (KuK_u) and Uptime-Weighted Capacity (capu\text{cap}_u):

    Ku=∑n∈Fleet(u)Bver(n),capu=⌊Ku⋅Auk(106)k⌋K_u = \sum_{n \in \text{Fleet}(u)} B_{\text{ver}}(n), \qquad \text{cap}_u = \left\lfloor \frac{K_u \cdot A_u^k}{(10^6)^k} \right\rfloor
    where Au∈[0,106]A_u \in [0, 10^6] is the operator's probe availability (uptime in ppm) and k=UPTIME_EXP=2k = \text{UPTIME\_EXP} = 2. Squaring uptime strongly penalizes flaky nodes (50%50\% uptime yields 25%25\% capacity credit).

  2. Node Delivery Quality (QnQ_n):

    lat_ppmn=min⁡(106,⌊predicted_usn⋅106measured_usn⌋)\text{lat\_ppm}_n = \min\!\left(10^6,\; \left\lfloor \frac{\text{predicted\_us}_n \cdot 10^6}{\text{measured\_us}_n} \right\rfloor\right)
    loss_ppmn=106−min⁡(106,loss_measured_ppmn⋅LOSS_MULT)\text{loss\_ppm}_n = 10^6 - \min\!\left(10^6,\; \text{loss\_measured\_ppm}_n \cdot \text{LOSS\_MULT}\right)
    Qn=⌊lat_ppmn⋅loss_ppmn106⌋Q_n = \left\lfloor \frac{\text{lat\_ppm}_n \cdot \text{loss\_ppm}_n}{10^6} \right\rfloor
    Crucially, predicted_usn\text{predicted\_us}_n is computed deterministically by validators from the window's topology snapshot link latencies (routing::route_predicted_us), never trusted from an unverified solver estimate. With LOSS_MULT=10\text{LOSS\_MULT} = 10, a node with ≥10%\ge 10\% packet loss receives Qn=0Q_n = 0.

Updated in version 1.1 (ADR-0053): the usage term useu\text{use}_u becomes verified canary carriage only: validator-allocated, delivered, digest-passing bytes. Paid and free customer bytes never enter it. Until PB-38 lands, Mechanism 0 pays on capacity alone (W=106W = 10^6), and the paid-traffic trigger described in 1.0 is retired (PB-40). Steps 3 and 5 below describe the 1.0 design.

Status in version 1.2:

  1. Quality-Adjusted Verified Usage (useu\text{use}_u):

    useu=∑n∈Fleet(u)∑c∈{paid,free,canary}⌊bytesver(n,c)⋅Wc⋅Qn⋅Cn1018⌋\text{use}_u = \sum_{n \in \text{Fleet}(u)} \sum_{c \in \{\text{paid}, \text{free}, \text{canary}\}} \left\lfloor \frac{\text{bytes}_{\text{ver}}(n, c) \cdot W_c \cdot Q_n \cdot C_n}{10^{18}} \right\rfloor
    where class weights are Wpaid=1,000,000 ppmW_{\text{paid}} = 1{,}000{,}000\text{ ppm}, Wfree=250,000 ppmW_{\text{free}} = 250{,}000\text{ ppm}, and Wcanary=100,000 ppmW_{\text{canary}} = 100{,}000\text{ ppm}, and Cn∈[106,Cmax]C_n \in [10^6, C_{\max}] is the geographic/ASN diversity multiplier.

  2. Usage Concentration Cap (USAGE_SHARE_CAP): To prevent a single large operator from monopolizing usage emissions, no UID's usage share useu/∑use\text{use}_u / \sum \text{use} may exceed USAGE_SHARE_CAP (250,000 ppm=25%250{,}000\text{ ppm} = 25\%) whenever at least ⌈106/USAGE_SHARE_CAP⌉=4\lceil 10^6 / \text{USAGE\_SHARE\_CAP} \rceil = 4 UIDs have positive usage. Excess share is iteratively clipped and redistributed pro rata across uncapped UIDs.

  3. Blended Mechanism 0 Share (shareu\text{share}_u):

    shareu=⌊ALPHA⋅capu∑jcapj⌋+⌊(106−ALPHA)⋅usêu∑jusêj⌋\text{share}_u = \left\lfloor \frac{\text{ALPHA} \cdot \text{cap}_u}{\sum_j \text{cap}_j} \right\rfloor + \left\lfloor \frac{(10^6 - \text{ALPHA}) \cdot \widehat{\text{use}}_u}{\sum_j \widehat{\text{use}}_j} \right\rfloor
    In 1.0, ALPHA=700,000 ppm\text{ALPHA} = 700{,}000\text{ ppm} (70%70\% bonded capacity, 30%30\% verified traffic usage). Since 1.1 the capacity weight is W, which is 10610^6 (capacity only) until PB-38's canary-carriage term lands, and the step-down tied to paid traffic is retired (ADR-0053, PB-40).


4.2 Mechanism 1 (mechid=1): Competitive Multi-Commodity Route Solving

In Mechanism 1, route solvers compete every window via commit-reveal (hash("route-table", table)) to optimize the global route table across five distinct QoS traffic classes (ADR-0017, ADR-0018). In the planned design they also compete on the peering plan, which decides which links the fabric runs (§4.2.1).

Live on testnet 611: a solver runs bwos-solver daemon around its own solver program, in any language. Each window it takes the validators' attested snapshot, solves, signs and commits a manifest naming its table before the deadline, and serves the table at its hotkey's axon for validators to pull. A table must beat the open-source reference solver by EPSILON_ROUTE (2%) to be paid.

Traffic Class Target Use Case Composite Objective Weights Hard SLA Gate
realtime VoIP, trading, gaming, interactive SSH 70%Glat+30%Gjit70\%\ G_{\text{lat}} + 30\%\ G_{\text{jit}} RTT≤direct\text{RTT} \le \text{direct}, jitter≤5 ms\text{jitter} \le 5\text{ ms}, loss≤0.5%\text{loss} \le 0.5\%
low_latency_hd 4K video conferencing, cloud desktop 50%Glat+50%Gbw50\%\ G_{\text{lat}} + 50\%\ G_{\text{bw}} RTT≤direct\text{RTT} \le \text{direct}, loss≤5.0%\text{loss} \le 5.0\%
bulk AI checkpoint sync, dataset replication 80%Gbw+20%Glat80\%\ G_{\text{bw}} + 20\%\ G_{\text{lat}} RTT≤1.50×direct\text{RTT} \le 1.50 \times \text{direct}, loss≤5.0%\text{loss} \le 5.0\%
economy Background backups, low-cost transit 70%Gcost+30%Glat70\%\ G_{\text{cost}} + 30\%\ G_{\text{lat}} RTT≤1.50×direct\text{RTT} \le 1.50 \times \text{direct}, loss≤5.0%\text{loss} \le 5.0\%
resilient Mission-critical dual-path HA links 60%Glat+40%(μdisj⋅Gbackup)60\%\ G_{\text{lat}} + 40\%\ (\mu_{\text{disj}} \cdot G_{\text{backup}}) Valid disjoint backup_path, loss≤5.0%\text{loss} \le 5.0\%

For each sampled demand pair p=(src,dst,class)p = (\text{src}, \text{dst}, \text{class}), validators evaluate the normalized improvement components clamped to [−106,+106] ppm[-10^6, +10^6]\text{ ppm} relative to the measured direct internet baseline:

Solver Score & Anti-Copycat Tournament Selection

A solver ss's overall window score is computed using the lower median of pairwise gains minus feasibility and route-flapping penalties:

scores=lower_medianp(gainp(s))−FEASIBILITY_PENALTY⋅overloaded_nodes(s)−⌊CHURN_PENALTY⋅churn_ppm(s)106⌋\text{score}_s = \text{lower\_median}_{p}\!\left(\text{gain}_p(s)\right) - \text{FEASIBILITY\_PENALTY} \cdot \text{overloaded\_nodes}(s) - \left\lfloor \frac{\text{CHURN\_PENALTY} \cdot \text{churn\_ppm}(s)}{10^6} \right\rfloor

4.2.1 Peer discovery: solvers compete on the peering plan (planned)

Status: planned. The design was approved on 2026-11-12 (System One autonomous peering design). It needs two ADRs (peering records and dynamic peers; peering plans in Mechanism 1) and an incentive red team before it is built, and it comes before the bug bounty. Nothing here is built or scored today; peering is self-service (§2.3).

A route table can only use links that exist. Today those links come from operators asking for peers, which is the opposite of what a fabric needs: a topology that is good for the whole network, which no node's own preference decides. The design gives that job to the solvers, who already see the whole snapshot and compete on routing.

4.2.2 Sharded solving (proposed)

ADR-0059 (proposed, gated off) splits solving by traffic-class group and destination region, decided by the founder on 2026-11-09. Each shard has its own competition, and the production table is a fixed, published merge of the shard winners that every validator recomputes and attests. It is not a table any company operates. Sharding by destination keeps every route towards a destination inside one shard, so the merged table stays loop-free. With one shard, it reproduces today's Mechanism 1 exactly. Implementation follows the first testnet wave.


5. Prosumer Edge Fleet Aggregation & The "Mine-to-Surf" Loop (ADR-0019) — later phase

Later phase, off the launch path. Launch is transit and route solving only. VPN exits, the client app and fleet-aggregator vouchers come after it (docs/launch-stages.md, Stage 5). Vouchers are commercial only and never earn emissions (ADR-0053), and the 1.0 voucher burn is retired. This section keeps the idea in short form.

Bittensor subnets have a fixed number of UID slots (e.g., 256), so desktop and home-lab users can't each register a UID. Two things address that:


6. Tokenomics: Emissions, Wholesale and the Buyer-Side Burn

Version 1.3 note (founder, 2026-11-13). This section is rewritten to the current model. Removed: the 1.1 model's 80/20 company buyback, the company's 20% fee on protocol revenue, the ALPHA step-down tied to the buyback, the subsidy ratios, and the three-year revenue, market-cap and company-income projections (1.2's §6.2 and §6.3). Their premises are retired (ADR-0053, ADR-0063, ADR-0064, ADR-0065), and the current model has no projection to replace them. In their place, this section says who pays whom, in what unit, and what is burned.

Status. Emissions-only pay is accepted (ADR-0053) and live on testnet 611 as capacity pay (§4.1). The buyer-side burn is the decided direction: the founder approved ADR-0063's direction and chose burn over recycle on 2026-11-11 (OQ-288). ADR-0063 itself is still proposed (revision 5), pending its red team and PB-49's simulations. US-dollar quoting (ADR-0065) is accepted in principle, with its details proposed. None of the wholesale path is built (PB-49).

6.1 Two flows that never meet (ADR-0053)

Transit Fabric keeps protocol pay and customer money in two separate flows. Nothing from the second ever enters the first as a scoring input.

  1. The emissions flow (live on testnet). Nodes, gateways, solvers and validators are paid only in the subnet's alpha emissions, allocated by what validators measure themselves: capacity and uptime today, canary carriage once PB-38 scores it (Mechanism 0), and routing quality (Mechanism 1). No node is paid for carrying traffic directly. The economic model's inputs (docs/economics/README.md, as of 2026-10-17) are Bittensor's 3,600 TAO/day of network emissions and the per-subnet split of 41% to miners (here, nodes and solvers), 41% to validators and 18% to the subnet owner. The owner's share is the subnet owner's own; it is not BandwidthOS revenue and not a protocol fund.
  2. The commercial flow (designed, ADR-0063 proposed). Customers pay resellers. Resellers buy wholesale capacity by burning TAO, and pay gateways a port fee. Payments, vouchers, credits, client receipts and the rate card are never a scoring input, so faking, buying or steering "paid" traffic earns nothing, and mishandling customer traffic can only lower a score (ADR-0053 §2).

How customer money reaches nodes and solvers: through the pool, never through receipts (ADR-0053 §4, ADR-0063). A wholesale purchase buys the subnet's alpha from its pool with TAO and destroys it. Each purchase puts TAO into the pool and removes the alpha it bought. A subnet's share of network emissions depends on its pool: the economic model takes it as set by the alpha price, and ADR-0065 counts a burn as TAO flow into the pool for the emission share. Either way, more customers make every participant's emissions worth more. Nobody, the company included, can move any participant's slice: allocation within the subnet is set only by measurement (ADR-0049, ADR-0053). One caution from ADR-0063 (OQ-288): SubnetAlphaOut doesn't drop on a burn, so a supply figure derived from it overstates circulating alpha.

6.2 Who pays whom, in what unit, and what is burned (ADR-0063, ADR-0065)

Payer Payee For Quoted in Paid in Burned?
End customer A reseller (BandwidthOS, a VPN, an ISP, a broker) The reseller's product: transit now, exits in a later phase The reseller's choice Any currency the reseller accepts (wire, card, USDC) No. The protocol never touches fiat or USDC
Reseller Nobody: the subnet pool The fabric fee: one window of a lane's rate cap and byte quota Micro-US-dollars (uusd, 10−610^{-6} USD) per GiB, on the validators' rate card TAO, by SubtensorModule.add_stake_burn from the reseller's own coldkey Yes. The TAO buys alpha from the pool, and that alpha is destroyed in the same call
Reseller Each lane gateway's registered coldkey The port fee, per window, before the next auction uusd per GiB, from the gateway's signed registration, fixed per credit by the card TAO, by Balances.transfer_keep_alive No. It is the gateway's revenue
The chain's emissions Nodes, gateways, solvers, validators and the owner Measured work (§4) — Alpha, every 360-block tempo No
flowchart LR
    Cust["End customers\n(any currency)"]
    Res["Resellers\n(BandwidthOS, VPNs, ISPs, brokers)"]
    Card["Validator-signed rate card\n(lanes, uusd prices, one TAO/USD reference)"]
    Burn["add_stake_burn, signed by the reseller\nTAO buys α from the pool; α destroyed"]
    Pool["Subnet pool: TAO in,\nbought α destroyed"]
    Em["Emissions: nodes, gateways,\nsolvers, validators, owner"]
    GW["Gateways\n(port fee in TAO, per window)"]

    Cust --> Res
    Card --> Res
    Res --> Burn
    Res --> GW
    Burn --> Pool
    Pool --> Em

Three layers, each with one job (ADR-0063 §1). The protocol publishes the rate card, reads purchases from the chain and publishes credits, balances and a burn ledger; nobody operates it and it takes nothing but burned TAO. Resellers sell to end customers, buy TAO, make purchases and issue BandwidthVouchers. Gateways (registered datacenter operators, ADR-0052) on-ramp and off-ramp traffic, meter it at both ends of a lane and enforce credits. Currency conversion is the reseller's job. There is no treasury, no custodian and no protocol fee: at the protocol level no one receives revenue except gateways, which receive their own port fees.

The rate card (ADR-0063 §2, amended by ADR-0065 §4). Each window, validators publish a signed card. A lane is an ordered pair of gateways run by different operators. v0 sells one class, best_effort: a byte quota plus a rate cap. For each lane:

headroom=min⁡(min_cut,egress)⋅𝚆𝙷𝙾𝙻𝙴𝚂𝙰𝙻𝙴_𝚂𝙴𝙻𝙻𝙰𝙱𝙻𝙴_𝙿𝙿𝙼106−sold rate\text{headroom} = \min(\text{min\_cut}, \text{egress}) \cdot \frac{\texttt{WHOLESALE\_SELLABLE\_PPM}}{10^6} - \text{sold rate}

priceuusd/GiB=𝚆𝙷𝙾𝙻𝙴𝚂𝙰𝙻𝙴_𝙵𝙻𝙾𝙾𝚁_𝚄𝚄𝚂𝙳_𝙿𝙴𝚁_𝙶𝙸𝙱⋅curve(utilization_ppm)106\text{price}_{\text{uusd/GiB}} = \frac{\texttt{WHOLESALE\_FLOOR\_UUSD\_PER\_GIB} \cdot \text{curve}(\text{utilization\_ppm})}{10^6}

where min_cut is the min-cut between the two gateways over verified capacity, egress is the egress gateway's measured throughput, and curve is a published integer piecewise-linear function that rises as the lane fills. To be set: the floor and the minimum purchase are calibrated in uusd before mainnet, and the curve breakpoints and WHOLESALE_SELLABLE_PPM are PB-49 parameters. None has a value yet.

Clearing (ADR-0063 §3). Each window's bids clear once, as a uniform-price batch auction per lane, ranked renewals first, then by max_price, then by a hash seeded after the cutoff. New fills pay the higher of the curve at final utilization and the highest max_price left unfilled for lack of headroom. Renewals pay the higher of the curve and the new-fill price capped at WHOLESALE_MAX_RENEWAL_STEP_PPM (proposed 10%) above their previous price. The price-setting unfilled bid forfeits WHOLESALE_BID_BOND_PPM (proposed 5%) of its fee. A credit runs one window at a time, with no fixed term.

A burn is final (ADR-0063 §3, revision 4). Nothing burned is refunded for unused bytes, a lapse, deregistration or a failed guard. Balance, held in uusd and owned by the payer coldkey, comes only from paying above the clearing price, being outbid, rounding remainders and explicit top-ups, and is spent by later bids.

Conversion: quoted in dollars, settled in TAO (ADR-0065 §3). The card for window vv carries one reference, tao_usd_ref: the chain's TaoUsdPrice.accepted read at the window's first block, in units of 10910^9 per USD. Every validator reads the same value. A burn of rao included in window vv is credited, rounded in the network's favour, as

uusd=⌊rao⋅𝚝𝚊𝚘_𝚞𝚜𝚍_𝚛𝚎𝚏1012⌋,and a fee due in uusd costsrao=⌈uusd⋅1012𝚝𝚊𝚘_𝚞𝚜𝚍_𝚛𝚎𝚏⌉.\text{uusd} = \left\lfloor \frac{\text{rao} \cdot \texttt{tao\_usd\_ref}}{10^{12}} \right\rfloor, \qquad \text{and a fee due in uusd costs} \quad \text{rao} = \left\lceil \frac{\text{uusd} \cdot 10^{12}}{\texttt{tao\_usd\_ref}} \right\rceil .

Worked example, with ADR-0065's own reference figure: at $211.00, tao_usd_ref = 211000000000. A burn of 1 TAO (10910^9 rao) is credited ⌊109⋅211,000,000,000/1012⌋\lfloor 10^9 \cdot 211{,}000{,}000{,}000 / 10^{12} \rfloor = 211,000,000 uusd, which is $211.00. The credit is fixed at inclusion; if TAO moves afterwards, it doesn't change. Resellers carry TAO/USD risk only between buying TAO and burning it, at most two windows. If the oracle is stale for more than WHOLESALE_ORACLE_MAX_AGE_BLOCKS (300), the card is held at the last fresh reference for up to WHOLESALE_ORACLE_HOLD_WINDOWS (3) windows, then unavailable. While it is held, new purchases and top-ups aren't credited, but renewals and balance spends continue. Once it is unavailable, only balance spends clear, and renewals that need a burn are suspended, not lapsed. Bittensor's Gamma credits are a later option, adopted only by a new ADR.

A real burn on testnet 611 (ADR-0063, 2026-11-11): a coldkey that is not the subnet owner sent one batch_all of add_stake_burn and a remark. It put 10,000,000 rao (0.01 TAO) into the pool, bought and burned 77,214,706 alpha, moved spot from 0.129362 to 0.129526 TAO per alpha, and paid a transaction fee of 993,533 rao (about 0.001 TAO, fixed per purchase).

Guards for alpha holders (ADR-0063 §3a; values from the OQ-291 replay of 8 young mainnet subnets, docs/economics/oq-291-guard-calibration.md). The protocol can't stop anyone's burn; it controls what it credits, and a burn that fails a guard is forfeited, never refunded, so evading a guard never pays. New purchases and top-ups face every guard; renewals face only the short-horizon band, the slippage cap and the size cap, so customers already served can't be cut off by a multi-day trend.

Guard Parameter Value
Reference price: median spot over about 7 days, sampled at blocks chosen after each window WHOLESALE_REF_WINDOWS / WHOLESALE_REF_SAMPLES_PER_WINDOW 140 windows / 4 (proposed)
Price band: a purchase's limit at most this far above the reference WHOLESALE_PRICE_BAND_PPM 25% (from OQ-291; was 15%)
Volatility gate: closes new purchases when the p90–p10 spread over the reference exceeds it WHOLESALE_MAX_VOL_PPM 40% (from OQ-291; was 30%)
Short-horizon band: execution price over the 50-block median WHOLESALE_SHORT_BAND_PPM / WHOLESALE_SHORT_REF_BLOCKS 5% / 50 blocks (proposed)
Slippage cap: execution over the simulated swap at the parent block WHOLESALE_MAX_SLIPPAGE_PPM 2% (proposed)
Size cap: one extrinsic's burns as a share of the pool's TAO reserve WHOLESALE_MAX_BURN_PPM 1% (proposed, calibrated on testnet)
Notice before any economic parameter, the floor or the curve changes WHOLESALE_PARAM_NOTICE_WINDOWS 600 windows (about 30 days)

The OQ-291 replay found that at 25%/40% the guard for new purchases was closed in about 14% of windows over a subnet's first 90 days, and about 7% over days 30 to 90, while still closing 92% of windows that jumped more than 25% above the previous day's median. A subnet's launch month stays about 37% closed under any setting; resellers ride that out on a balance buffer (ADR-0064 §6).

The burn ledger (ADR-0063 §3b). Each window, validators publish one row per burn (payer, TAO in, alpha burned, outcome) and two identities anyone can recompute from the chain: TAO burned = credited + balance created + forfeited + held pending, and credited + balance spent = value of windows held. The company's own wholesale coldkeys are listed in it.

One disclosed asymmetry (ADR-0063 §1, red team L1). Every reseller pays the same clearing price, but a buyer that holds alpha gets back part of its fee through the price rise its own purchase causes. Every buyback works this way; it is disclosed, not fixed.

6.3 What BandwidthOS earns, and what nobody earns (ADR-0063 §6, ADR-0064)

What the old projections covered and the current model doesn't. The 1.1 model's VPN backbone and pay-per-GB exit revenue depend on exits, a later phase. The telemetry feed (§7.1) is a later phase: it has no settlement path in ADR-0063. The repository's historical economic model still assumes the retired buyback and company fee, so this section uses only its emission inputs.


7. BandwidthOS, the Model Home: Commercial Operations & Go-To-Market Workflows

Version 1.2 note (ADR-0062, ADR-0064). Transit Fabric is the open protocol and network; it is not a business. BandwidthOS is the one company the founder runs around it: the first reseller and first gateway, run in public as a working example anyone can copy. Everything it runs to operate (sign-up and accounts, billing adapter, TAO procurement, wholesale buying, voucher issuance, the customer dashboard, gateway operation and runbooks) is published as an open-source reference reseller under Apache-2.0. It has no protocol privilege: it pays the clearing price like every reseller, gets no early access to parameters or data, and gets no peering advantage. It competes on operations, support and brand. It earns a reseller's margin, never protocol revenue (§6.3). Whether the company is an Inc. or an LLC is not yet decided. Nothing in this section is built yet: wholesale is PB-49, the reference reseller PB-50, gateways PB-39.

7.1 Market Positioning: Programmable NaaS & Middle-Mile SD-WAN

While the Transit Fabric Bittensor subnet provides the decentralized incentive, measurement, and settlement layer, enterprise buyers, AI cloud operators, and commercial VPN providers need a standard commercial counterparty. Under ADR-0063 any reseller can be that counterparty on the same terms; BandwidthOS is the first. It positions itself as Programmable Network-as-a-Service (NaaS) and Middle-Mile SD-WAN, at the market intersection of Megaport / PacketFabric (elastic inter-datacenter transit) and Cloudflare Magic WAN / Argo (real-time latency/jitter-optimized routing), backed by the fabric's open supply.

A reseller can sell two core products and, later, two by-products:

  1. Aggregated Transit on Demand (Elastic Middle-Mile), planned: Customers establish a single eBGP/IPsec/WireGuard session into a registered gateway (ADR-0052), or reach it over a cross-connect or proxy, and gain burst transit across the global fleet of Mechanism 0 operators. The aim is pricing 30–50% below hyperscale egress and legacy SD-WAN contracts, because underlying miners are monetizing sunk 95th-percentile commit headroom. The zero-touch 1U Transit Fabric Edge appliance is a later phase.
  2. Near-Real-Time QoS-Based Routing ("BGP with a Brain"), planned as a product: Powered by Mechanism 1 route solvers and validator measurement, customers steer traffic across five SLA-enforced QoS classes (realtime, low_latency_hd, bulk, economy, resilient) with sub-second BFD failover onto interior-node-disjoint backup paths (520–680 ms measured over the internet in Phase A).
  3. Turnkey Multi-Region VPN Exit & Edge Access, later phase: Wholesale and retail exit access via registered Exit Partners (ADR-0004) authorized by BandwidthVouchers, which are commercial only.
  4. Global Link-Metric Telemetry Feed, later phase: pairwise latency, jitter, packet loss, and link-saturation matrices from validator measurement, for trading desks, CDNs, and WAN observability platforms.

7.2 BandwidthOS Nodes: a Reference Deployment (planned)

Version 1.3 note (founder, 2026-11-13; ADR-0064 §8). This replaces 1.1's company-owned "Anchor Core Routers" and 1.2's hub-node text, including its projection of capacity pay against hub transit cost, which rested on the retired ALPHA.

BandwidthOS may run nodes, but only as a reference implementation: open-source code and a public example that others copy, so they can run nodes and resell as well. Its nodes:

Today on testnet, the team runs public nodes that peer with testers' nodes on request (§2.3), and every validator on subnet 611 is the team's own until outside validators join.

7.3 Transaction Clearing & Settlement Workflow (Fiat/USDC to a TAO Burn)

Version 1.2 note (ADR-0063, ADR-0065): this replaces the 1.1 workflow, in which the company bought alpha with customer revenue. Proposed details, pending a red team; not built (PB-49, PB-39).

Enterprise customers never need to custody TAO or α\alpha or manage Subtensor hotkeys. A reseller such as BandwidthOS clears transactions end-to-end:

  1. Commercial Invoicing: The customer pays the reseller in any currency it accepts (wire, ACH, card or USDC) under a monthly commit or pay-per-GB agreement.
  2. Wholesale Purchase: The reseller bids for a lane on the validators' rate card, priced in US dollars. Its own coldkey signs one batch_all: add_stake_burn, burning TAO converted at the window's TAO/USD reference, plus a remark naming the credit. The window clears as a batch auction, and anything paid above the clearing price comes back as a dollar balance.
  3. Credit and Quota Issuance (BandwidthVoucher): Validators read the purchase from the chain and publish the credit. The reseller issues BandwidthVouchers (domain: "bandwidth-voucher") scoped to its customer's keys, which the lane's gateways meter and enforce.
  4. Per-Window Renewal and Port Fees: A credit runs one window at a time, renewed by further bids, and each window's port fee is paid in TAO straight to each lane gateway's registered coldkey.
  5. Miner Payouts Through Emissions: Validators never pay miners from receipts or vouchers: nodes and solvers are paid in α\alpha emissions from measured capacity, availability and, once scored, canary carriage, every 360-block tempo. Customer money reaches them through the burn's effect on the subnet's pool, with no accounts-payable process across hundreds of independent operators.
  6. The Reseller's Margin: What the reseller keeps is its customer revenue less the fabric fees it burned, the port fees it paid and its own costs (§6.3).

7.4 Go-To-Market Sequences & End-to-End User Stories

Version 1.3 note. These sequences are illustrative, with fictional names, and were first written for 1.1. Their contract figures stand. Where a step relied on company-owned anchor routers or on the retired buyback, it follows ADR-0063 and ADR-0064, and 1.3 removes the 1.1 figures that rested on the buyback or on ALPHA (§6). Sequence 3's appliance and all of Sequence 4 are later phases.

Sequence 1 (Beachhead 1 — Months 1–6): Reference Nodes & Onboarding VPN Providers

Sequence 2 (Beachhead 2 — Months 3–9): Distributed AI / Neo-Cloud GPU Cluster Interconnects

Sequence 3 (Beachhead 3 — Months 6–18): Enterprise HA WAN (resilient) & Telemetry Data Buyers

Sequence 4 (later phase): Prosumer Desktop, OpenWrt & "Mine-to-Surf"


8. Security, Privacy & Wire-Obscurity Analysis

8.1 Resistance to Economic & Protocol Attacks

Threat Vector Protocol Defense Mechanism Economic / Verification Outcome
Self-Dealing / Wash-Trading Since 1.1, customer traffic is never credited (ADR-0053): paid bytes earn no emissions, so faking or steering them earns nothing. Canary carriage is validator-allocated (ADR-0051) Zero gain by construction (1.0 measured 0.96x under the retired voucher-burn design)
Hop Counter Inflation Bilateral HopReceipt co-signing (0.5% tolerance) + multi-hop chain conservation audit Inflating interior hop is deterministically zeroed
Missing Middle Receipt Contiguous path receipt verification (n0,n1)…(nk−1,nk)(n_0, n_1) \dots (n_{k-1}, n_k) Entire incomplete path segment is zeroed
Capacity Over-Claiming Random 10s saturation capacity tests (CAP_TEST_PERIOD = 900) + OVERCLAIM_PENALTY_PPM (20% haircut for 24 windows) Over-claiming yields 0.73x return per real Mbps vs. 1.00x honest
Selective Canary Prioritization Goal, not yet true: canaries still differ from paid flows in source, timing and size (threat model T19, Phase B Task 14); QnQ_n penalizes latency/loss inflation Dropping customer traffic degrades QnQ_n and zeroes usage credit
Solver Copycatting / Sybil Commit-reveal + EPSILON_ROUTE (2%) margin + identical gains_ppm vector deduplication Copycat solvers receive 0 Mechanism 1 weight
BGP Prefix Hijacking /128 fc00::/8 IPv6 address is 0xfc || SHA-512(SHA-512(pubkey))[0..15] Cryptographically impossible without Ed25519 private key
Exit Node SSRF / Local Egress Strict target IP validation (is_forbidden_egress_ip blocks RFC 1918, loopback, link-local 169.254.0.0/16, fc00::/8, and IPv4-mapped IPv6 ::ffff:0:0/96) Returns HTTP 403 Forbidden before socket connect

8.2 Wire-Level Privacy ("Entry ≠\neq Exit") — later phase

Version 1.2 note: these properties concern client traffic through exits, a later phase. Nothing on testnet 611 leaves the overlay. Item 2 is corrected per ADR-0040: Transit Fabric makes no claim that node links resist DPI or blocking.

Compared to traditional single-hop VPNs (where a single server sees both the user's residential IP and their destination traffic, and whose IP address is publicly cataloged on commercial VPN blocklists), Transit Fabric's flat eBGP architecture would provide these structural privacy properties:

  1. Compartmentalized Metadata: The ingress node knows the client's outer IP address but only sees packets destined for an fc00::/8 exit address. Interior Transit Nodes see only encrypted fc00::/8 -> fc00::/8 backbone frames. The Exit Node connects to the public destination (:443), but sees only the client's fc00::/8 overlay address—never the client's physical IP—while the payload remains end-to-end TLS 1.3 encrypted from the client's OS.
  2. Not on exit blocklists (corrected in 1.2): A Mechanism 0 transit node never makes outbound connections to websites, so its address doesn't appear on commercial VPN exit blocklists. That is all it gives. The entry connection is WireGuard today, which DPI middleboxes can identify and block, so Transit Fabric claims no censorship resistance for it (ADR-0040).
  3. Wire fingerprint (corrected 2026-11-01): datacenter backbone links that run IPsec ESP (RFC 4303) or MACsec look like enterprise interconnects. WireGuard links, which every home and no-root node uses, are easy to identify and don't share that property (ADR-0040).

9. Empirical Evaluation & Multi-Region Benchmarks

9.1 50-Window Adversarial Incentive Simulation (bwos-sim)

We evaluated Mechanism 0 and Mechanism 1 over 50 consecutive windows (make sim) across 9 competing operator archetypes. Measuring score share per unit of real physical Mbps supplied (normalized to Honest = 1.00x), every adversarial strategy underperforms honest participation:

Operator Strategy Real Capacity Supplied 50-Window Mean Score Share Efficiency vs. Honest (1.00x)
Honest Operator 1,000 Mbps 20.69% 1.00x (Baseline)
Self-Dealer (Wash-Trader) 1,000 Mbps 19.77% 0.96x (1.0 design, penalized by voucher burn & cap; since 1.1 paid traffic earns nothing)
Receipt Inflator 1,000 Mbps 14.23% 0.69x (inflated hop chains zeroed)
Over-Claimer (3×3\times fake claim) 1,000 Mbps 15.14% 0.73x (OVERCLAIM_PENALTY_PPM haircut)
Flaky Operator (60%60\% uptime) 1,000 Mbps 11.49% 0.56x (quadratic UPTIME_EXP = 2 penalty)
Canary-Gaming Operator 1,000 Mbps 14.23% 0.69x (QnQ_n latency/loss gate)
Sybil Operator (split across UIDs) 1,000 Mbps 20.52% 0.99x (linear invariance; extra registration cost)

9.2 Live Multi-Region Hardware-in-the-Loop (HIL) Benchmarks

Version 1.2 note: these runs used the 1.0 prototype client and exit path. Client access and exits are a later phase, so Table 2 measures the overlay prototype, not a service available today.

We deployed bwos-node across three live cloud datacenter regions—US-Central (US-IL-1, Chicago, Illinois), US-East (US-NC-1, Raleigh, North Carolina), and Europe (EU-RO-1, Cluj-Napoca, Romania)—and connected a live macOS desktop client (bwos-client app, fce0:7248:...) over Wi-Fi (en1) using Layer-4 HTTPS CONNECT (127.0.0.1:7781) and SOCKS5h (127.0.0.1:7782) system routing.

Table 1: In-Datacenter bwos-node Engine Overhead (US-IL-1)

Metric Measured Value Notes
Control-Plane + Receipt Verification RTT (p50p_{50}) 0.164 ms (147 µs min) 50 consecutive queries on US-IL-1 (Linux 6.8.0-79-generic)
Control-Plane + Receipt Verification RTT (p99p_{99}) 1.157 ms Includes JSON canonicalization & Ed25519 verification
Node Direct Egress Line Rate (50 MB TLS 1.3) 766.8 Mbps (0.522 s) Sustained TLS 1.3 stream to Cloudflare CDN

Table 2: End-to-End Multi-Region Overlay Performance (macOS Client ──► Ingress ──► BGP Transit ──► Exit ──► Internet)

Selected Regional Exit Overlay Hops Verified Public Egress IP & Cloudflare PoP Signed ClientReceipt + Co-Signed HopReceipt RTT (p50p_{50}) End-to-End TLS 1.3 Handshake (:443) Sustained 10 MB TLS 1.3 Stream (to macOS Wi-Fi)
US-Central (US-IL-1 · Illinois) 2 hops (address redacted) (US · PoP: MSP) 314.9 ms (313.3 ms min) 446.7 ms 53.90 Mbps (1.48 s)
Europe (EU-RO-1 · Romania) 4 hops (address redacted) (RO · PoP: FRA) 759.6 ms (755.4 ms min) 824.5 ms 35.72 Mbps (2.24 s)
US-East (US-NC-1 · North Carolina) 3 hops (address redacted) (US · PoP: IAD) 539.2 ms (441.7 ms min) 569.2 ms 27.69 Mbps (2.89 s)

10. Normative Protocol Parameters

Parameter Default Value Normative Meaning
ALPHA 700_000 ppm (70%70\%) 1.0 value. Replaced by W, which is 1_000_000 (capacity only) until PB-38's canary-carriage term lands; the paid-traffic step-down is retired (ADR-0053, PB-40)
UPTIME_EXP 2 Exponent kk on probe availability AuA_u in capacity scoring
W_PAID / W_FREE / W_CANARY 1_000_000 / 250_000 / 100_000 ppm 1.0 traffic class weights. Paid and free bytes are never credited since 1.1 (ADR-0053); the canary-carriage term is set by PB-38
USAGE_SHARE_CAP 250_000 ppm (25%25\%) Maximum usage share any single UID may capture
RECEIPT_TOLERANCE_PPM 5_000 ppm (0.5%0.5\%) Maximum allowed counter divergence between adjacent hops
CAP_TOLERANCE_PPM 100_000 ppm (10%10\%) Allowed shortfall in random saturation capacity tests
OVERCLAIM_PENALTY_PPM 200_000 ppm (20%20\%) Haircut below measured capacity when a node over-claims
EPSILON_ROUTE 20_000 ppm (2%2\%) Required improvement margin to unseat the incumbent route table
LADDER_N / LADDER_DECAY_PPM 8 / 500_000 ppm Mechanism 1 ladder: rungs and each rung's weight relative to the one above (replaces WINNER_SHARE)
CLONE_DISTANCE_PPM 20_000 ppm (2%2\%) A table this close to an earlier-committed one scores 0
OVERLAY_BASE_ASN 4_200_000_000 Base RFC 6996 4-byte private ASN for fc00::/8 eBGP peers
MAX_REALTIME_JITTER_US 5_000 µs (5 ms5\text{ ms}) Hard jitter SLA gate for realtime routes
MAX_REALTIME_LOSS_PPM 5_000 ppm (0.5%0.5\%) Hard packet loss SLA gate for realtime routes
PROTOCOL_VOUCHER_BURN_PPM 50_000 ppm (5%5\%) Retired in 1.1 (ADR-0053): vouchers are commercial only and carry no protocol burn
MAX_AGGREGATOR_COMMISSION_PPM 200_000 ppm (20%20\%) Later phase. Maximum commission a Fleet Aggregator UID can deduct from sub-nodes
SENSE_MAX_RUNS_PER_DAY 3 System One runs a skill at most this often per symptom code in 24 hours, then escalates (ADR-0067)
FAULT_REPORTS_PER_WINDOW 4 Most fault reports a node may send per window; validators' stores drop the rest (ADR-0067)

Peering parameters (PEER_CHANGES_PER_WINDOW, PEER_EXPLORE, PEER_SUSPEND_WINDOWS, the draw size and MAX_PEERS) are set by their ADRs and are not yet fixed. Wholesale parameters (ADR-0063, ADR-0065) are proposed; §6.2 lists the guard values, and the floor, curve and minimum purchase are calibrated before mainnet.


11. Conclusion

Transit Fabric demonstrates that an open, decentralized network does not have to choose between cryptographic verifiability and datacenter line-rate performance. By deriving every node's /128 fc00::/8 IPv6 identity from its Ed25519 key, flattening the control plane into end-to-end eBGP with competitive Mechanism 1 route solvers that will also plan the fabric's peering, isolating public internet egress to registered exit partners and gateways (ADR-0004, ADR-0052), enforcing conservation of flow via co-signed HopReceipts, paying nodes only in emissions for what validators measure, and letting buyers burn TAO for capacity with no treasury in between, Transit Fabric aims to turn idle global transit capacity into a programmable, institutional-grade backbone. Its transit and route-solving core runs today on Bittensor testnet, subnet 611.